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DECONSTRUCTING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: 
ABSOLUTE DIRECTOR PRIMACY 
René Reich-Graefe* 
ABSTRACT 
Microtheoretical models of the corporation which focus on corporate 
governance attempt to answer two deceptively simple, but fundamentally 
elusive questions: ‘Who are in control of the corporation?’ and ‘Whose 
interests ultimately control those in control of the corporation?’ Both 
questions remain partially unanswered within the models developed to date 
by corporate theoreticians. This Article proposes a radically new model: 
‘absolute director primacy.’ Existing microtheoretical models conceive that 
we only need to—and, indeed, can—determine the controlling interests 
guiding corporate decisionmaking in order to prove the existence of control 
over the decisionmaking latitude of corporate boards. The absolute director 
primacy model reverses this thinking: The corporate board—as the private-
sector equivalent of a modern Leviathan—has absolute and infinite 
decisionmaking latitude in order to control the business and affairs of the 
corporation. Nothing within corporate law provides any meaningful 
modicum of predictive ability regarding director behavior ex ante or 
director accountability ex post. As a result, model-immanent explanations 
of the phenomenon of general investor confidence pre-investment in the 
face of absent director accountability post-investment become logically 
impossible. Thus, the absolute director primacy model not only posits a 
complete absence of ex-post director accountability but accepts the 
complete ex-ante indeterminability of director decisionmaking. 
Accordingly, the absolute director primacy model further posits that largely 
unexplained and currently unaccounted-for protolegal variables control 
both director behavior and the microtheoretical models of the firm that 
attempt to explain and predict such behavior. 
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Aut tace, aut loquere meliora silentio. [Be silent unless to 
speak is better than silence.] 
—Salvator Rosa (1615-73), Self Portrait (National Gallery, London) 
I. OPENING SKETCHES 
Whether we like it or not:1 “the genius of American corporate law”2 is 
autocratic and elitist—and, possibly, totalitarian.3 Such qualities are most 
pronounced when the genius is employed by discreet structurations of 
economic concentration operating in the form of the modern Berle-Means 
corporation.4 Corporate law—commonly regarded as a well-functioning 
                                                                                                                           
 1. As has been observed before, (at least, some) “[w]affling is obligatory to law-review 
writing.” See J. Mark Ramseyer, Economizing Legal D-B8, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 25, 29 n.12 
(2005). 
 2. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1, 151 (1993); Fred S. 
McChesney, The “Trans Union” Case: Smith v. Van Gorkom, in THE ICONIC CASES IN 
CORPORATE LAW 231, 256 (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 2008) [hereinafter McChesney, The “Trans 
Union” Case]. Cf. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 3 (2008) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE]. Even though the 
reference is to American corporate law, it is often claimed, as part of the so-called ‘convergence 
debate,’ that such genius of American corporate law is more and more universally accepted. See, 
e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16 
TRANSNAT’L LAW. 45, 45 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Convergence Debate]; Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 
439, 468 (2001) [hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of History]. 
 3. Cf. Kenneth J. Arrow, Scale Returns in Communication and Elite Control of 
Organizations, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 6 (1991) (describing how elite control of organizations is 
necessary in order to achieve economies of scale within the communication and decision flows of 
organizations); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 557 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, The Means and Ends] 
(comparing the central decisionmaker in large public corporations to “an autocrat”); id. at 555 
(stating that “public corporations are not participatory democracies, but hierarchies in which 
decisions are made on a fairly authoritarian basis”); Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and 
Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703, 1718-26 (1989) (discussing 
(disguised) elite rulemaking in corporate law as one of the sources for corporate law rules); 
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise on Corporate Law: Filling Manning’s 
Empty Towers, 31 J. CORP. L. 599, 604 (2006) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise] 
(inquiring whether corporate boards are “mediating plutocrats”); id. at 604 n.21 (asking whether 
“we want to encourage an institution that is disproportionately white, male and conservative to 
make social policy?”); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Corporate Governance, Culture, and Convergence: 
Corporations American Style or With a European Touch?, 9 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 33, 56 (2003) 
(“[T]he CEO in the modern American corporation is like that of a third-world autocrat.”). 
 4. The legal and economic nature of the publicly held corporation, with widely disbursed 
shareownership and an almost complete separation of ownership and control, was first thoroughly 
analyzed and established as a distinct subject of corporate law study by Adolf Berle and Gardiner 
Means. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
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enabling framework5 for economic liberty and private-party 
entrepreneurship6—is the principal legal vehicle utilized in order to remove 
large areas of economic activity from free-market forces and to internalize 
and concentrate such activity in planned economies under an absolutist, 
hierarchical command-and-control structure.7 These market-insulated, 
planned economies8 are not centralist state economies (in which case the 
                                                                                                                           
PRIVATE PROPERTY 84–89, 119–25 (1932). But see FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND 
PROFIT 291 (1921) (“The typical form of business unit in the modern world is the corporation. Its 
most important characteristic is the combination of diffused ownership with concentrated 
control.”). See also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 3–5, 72 (2d ed. 2009) 
[hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW]; JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 
CORPORATIONS 39–40 (2d ed. 2003); Bainbridge, Convergence Debate, supra note 2, at 46; 
William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 
739–40, 753–59 (2001) [hereinafter Bratton, Century’s Turn]; Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View 
of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 303 n.9 (1993) [hereinafter Hart, An Economist’s 
View]; David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 214; Charles R.T. 
O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern Corporation, 31 J. CORP. L. 753, 754 
(2006) [hereinafter O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation]; Arthur R. Pinto, An Overview 
of United States Corporate Governance in Publicly Traded Corporations, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 
257, 259–60 (2010). On the legacy of Berle and Means and their groundbreaking research, see 
generally Kelli A. Alces, Revisiting Berle and Rethinking the Corporate Structure, 33 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 787 (2010); William W. Bratton, Jr. & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s 
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008) 
[hereinafter Bratton & Wachter, Corporatist Origins]; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, 
Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 849 (2010); Charles R. T. O’Kelley, Berle and the Entrepreneur, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
1141 (2010); Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1247 
(2010). Hence the moniker ‘Berle-Means corporation’ in order to designate such type of public 
corporation, as well as the term ‘Berle-Means paradigm’ in order to describe the intellectual 
framework that has informed the study of large publicly-held corporations ever since. See, e.g., 
O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra at 759; Bratton, Century’s Turn, supra at 
737. 
 5. William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1395, 1400 (1993) [hereinafter Allen, Contracts and Communities]; Edward B. Rock & 
Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law: Introduction, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1608, 
1617 (2001) [hereinafter Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law]. 
 6. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Separation and the Function of Corporation Law, 2 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 141, 147 (2005) [hereinafter Gilson, Separation and Function] (pointing out that 
“markets encourage a management and governance structure that fits the corporation’s business” 
and that “[c]orporate law has nothing to add to the process”); Milton Friedman, The Social 
Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970 [hereinafter 
Friedman, Social Responsibility]. 
 7. Cf. ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES 103 (1994) (describing how intellectuals 
and policy makers early in the 20th century already observed that an economy dominated by huge 
corporations made nonsense of the term ‘perfect competition’). See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Competing Concepts of the Corporation (a.k.a. Criteria? Just Say No), 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 77, 
81 (2005) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Just Say No]; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, 
at 555; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and 
the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 827–28 (1999); O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern 
Corporation, supra note 4; Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, supra note 5, at 1617. 
 8. Cf. D. H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (1923) (stating that firms are 
“islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation [namely, the market], like 
lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk”); G.B. Richardson, The Organisation of 
Industry, 82 ECON. J. 883, 883 (1972) (describing firms in general as “islands of planned co-
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orthodox view would classify them as socialist or nonmarket economies).9 
They are what economists and corporate theorists call ‘firms.’10 And the 
modern Berle-Means corporation, the type of firm with the largest 
concentration of economic power and the greatest amount of economic 
separation from the market,11 has become the functional aliud of nonmarket 
economies in the sphere of post-capitalist12 industrial organization. 
Operating in tandem with global economies of scale,13 the genius of 
                                                                                                                           
ordination in a sea of market relations”). See also Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 
ECONOMICA 386, 393 (1937). 
  These, then, are the reasons why organisations such as firms exist in a specialised 
exchange economy in which it is generally assumed that the distribution of resources is 
“organised” by the price mechanism. A firm, therefore, consists of the system of 
relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent 
on an entrepreneur. 
Id.; Walter W. Powell, Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, 12 RES. 
ORGAN. BEHAV. 295, 297 (1990); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious 
Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1621 (2001) 
[hereinafter Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power]. 
 9. Cf. Robert G. Eccles & Harrison C. White, Price and Authority in Inter-Profit Center 
Transactions, 94 AM. J. SOC. S17, S18 (1988) (comparing firms with planned economies); 
Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 727, 737 
(2004). 
  The nature of the firm puzzles economists because the classic hierarchical firm 
displaces the price signals used to guide economic activity in the market with the same 
kind of fiat that guides economic activity in planned economies. The parallel between a 
firm and a planned economy is strong. The control rights to its assets are held 
collectively, as are the returns from these assets. It is puzzling to find capitalist 
economies so fully embracing an apparently inefficient mode of organization. 
Meurer, supra (footnote omitted). 
 10. Cf. Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power, supra note 8. There is, of course, also a 
colloquial, plain-English meaning of the ‘firm’ which similarly describes a business enterprise. 
See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 438–39 (10th ed. 1996). 
 11. Cf. Coase, supra note 8, at 388 (asking “in view of the fact that it is usually argued that co-
ordination will be done by the price mechanism, why is such organization necessary?” and then 
explaining that the “firm . . . consists of the system of relationships which comes into existence 
when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur”). See COX & HAZEN, supra note 
4, at 40; Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1398; Michael P. Dooley, Two 
Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 464 (1992); Mark Granovetter, Business 
Groups and Social Organization, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 429, 429 (Neil J. 
Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 2000) [hereinafter Granovetter, Business Groups]; Meurer, 
supra note 9; Powell, supra note 8, at 296–97; Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power, 
supra note 8. See also Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of 
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 692 (1986) 
(differentiating between specific rights and residual rights in order to explain firm boundaries); 
Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 
1119, 1119 (1990) (setting forth a framework for addressing the question of “when transactions 
should be carried out within the firm and when through the market”). 
 12. Cf. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist Society, 24 J. 
CORP. L. 869 (1999) [hereinafter Mitchell, Trust and Team Production]. 
 13. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 4; ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, 
CORPORATE LAW 2 (1986) [hereinafter CLARK, CORPORATE LAW]. 
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American corporate law has enabled economic behemoths of private 
ordering that not only rival but regularly exceed the productivity and 
financial wherewithal of nation-state economies.14 
Consider an oft-cited example in this context: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
(Wal-Mart).15 As the world’s largest, fully-integrated retailing business,16 
Wal-Mart accumulates to nothing more than a fiction in the legal realm17—a 
corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware.18 Its almost 
four billion outstanding shares of common stock19 are principally traded on 
the New York Stock Exchange,20 but its almost 300,000 shareholders21 will 
never be able to touch22 what they own23—in most cases, not even in the 
                                                                                                                           
 14. See, e.g., Allison D. Garrett, The Corporation as Sovereign, 60 ME. L. REV. 129, 131 
(2008); Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, in THE ICONIC CASES IN 
CORPORATE LAW 1, 10 (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 2008) [hereinafter Stout, Why We Should Stop 
Teaching Dodge v. Ford]. 
 15. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 14, at 146–48; Kent Greenfield, New Principles For 
Corporate Law, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 87, 101 (2005); Benedict Sheehy, Corporations and Social 
Costs: The Wal-Mart Case Study, 24 J.L. & COM. 1, 33–49 (2004); Stout, Why We Should Stop 
Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 10. 
 16. See Corporate Facts: Wal-Mart by the Numbers, WALMARTSTORES.COM, 2 (Mar. 2010), 
http://walmartstores.com/download/2230.pdf [hereinafter Wal-Mart Corporate Facts]. 
 17. The corporation is a human invention, a fictitious ‘legal’ person. See, e.g., Trs. of 
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (“A corporation is an artificial being, 
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
307 (5th ed. 1979) (listing “artificial person” within the definition of corporation); BAINBRIDGE, 
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 1; CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 15; Allen, 
Contracts and Communities, supra note 5; Bernhard Grossfeld, Management and Control of 
Marketable Share Companies, in 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 
4, § 2, at 4 (Alfred Conard & Detlev Vagts eds., 2006); Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. 
FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976); Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the 
Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1980) (“persona ficta”); Stout, Why We Should 
Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 11. Arguably, all of corporate law (indeed, all of 
law) is a human invention and, therefore, fictitious. Cf. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, 
at 15. 
 18. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Apr. 1, 2009), available at 
http://ccbn.10kwizard.com/xml/download.php?format=PDF&ipage=6245246 [hereinafter Wal-
Mart Form 10-K 2009]. 
 19. As of March 27, 2009, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. had 3,915,118,871 shares of common stock 
outstanding. See id. at 1. 
 20. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.: Listing Profile, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 
http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/wmt.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2011); Wal-Mart Form 10-K 
2009, supra note 18, at 18. 
 21. As of March 27, 2009, Wal-Mart had 298,263 common stock shareholders of record. See 
Wal-Mart Form 10-K 2009, supra note 18, at 18; WAL-MART STORES, INC., 2009 ANNUAL 
REPORT 56, available at http://walmartstores.com/download/3661.pdf [hereinafter WAL-MART 
2009 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 22. Or see, hear, feel, smell or taste—not that they would really care to. Cf. Stout, Why We 
Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 11 (stating that “[c]orporations are purely 
legal creatures, without flesh, blood, or bone”). Since the corporation is a human invention, there 
is no way of truly reifying the same. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 117–18 (10th ed. 2007); 
Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 552–53; Grossfeld, supra note 17. Though it 
should be noted that, etymologically, the word ‘firm’ (from the Latin ‘firmare’ [= to make firm] 
346 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 5 
form of a physical share certificate.24 What makes this legal fiction tangible, 
however, and indeed a vast economic reality is that Wal-Mart owns, 
controls and operates an enormous empire of productive resources which 
generates superlatives in the global marketplace on an Olympian scale: net 
sales of $401.2 billion in its 2008 fiscal year;25 a market capitalization of 
close to $220 billion at the end of 2008 (ranking Wal-Mart, at the time, the 
third-largest publicly listed enterprise by market capitalization in the 
world);26 sourcing and moving 5.5 billion cases of merchandise27 through a 
fully integrated supply chain into 7,873 stores worldwide;28 all of which 
facilitated by a global sales force of 2.1 million people29 serving about 
four million customers weekly30 in fifteen different countries of operation.31 
To put it differently: Wal-Mart serves as the nerve center—the central hub 
                                                                                                                           
and ‘firmus’ [= firm, solid]—similarly, for example, in German ‘Firma’) has exactly that reifying 
and solidifying meaning. It also means the signature or name under which the business operates, 
another distinct and exclusive way to denote the idea of something autonomously existing in the 
marketplace above and beyond the existence of the individual firm participants. See, e.g., 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 438–39 (10th ed. 1996). See also Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (“A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals 
under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity.”); HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP 
OF ENTERPRISE 18–19 (1996) (defining the firm as “the common signatory of a group of 
contracts” and continuing that “[i]n small firms organized as sole proprietorships, the individual 
proprietor signs these contracts [but i]n a corporation or a partnership, the party that signs the 
contracts is a legal entity”). 
 23. There is debate among strands of current corporate theory as to whether shareholders can 
indeed ‘own’ the corporation. The ‘contractarian’ model of corporate theory denies that such is the 
case. See, e.g., Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3 passim; Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 
825–26 (arguing that shareholders own the corporation since they possess most of the incidents of 
ownership or property rights; thus, stock ownership is private property); Friedman, Social 
Responsibility, supra note 6 (stating that “[i]n a free enterprise, private-property system, the 
corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the business” and “[i]nsofar as his actions . . . 
reduce returns to stockholders, he is spending their money”). 
 24. Many of Wal-Mart’s shareholders will hold their shares issued in ‘street name,’ i.e., 
through their bank, broker, trustee or other financial agent. These financial intermediaries will be 
registered as the shareholders of record and the share certificates will be made out in their name 
rather than in the name of the actual, i.e., beneficial holders, of Wal-Mart common stock and will 
be endorsed in blank. See, e.g., COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, at 485; RICHARD W. HAMILTON & 
RICHARD A. BOOTH, BLACK LETTER OUTLINES: CORPORATIONS 888 (5th ed. 2006). 
 25. Wal-Mart Form 10-K 2009, supra note 18, at 3. It should be noted that the fiscal year of 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ends on January 31 each calendar year. See id. at 3; WAL-MART 2009 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 56. Nevertheless, for ease of comparison with various 
national and the international gross domestic products hereinafter, I shall treat Wal-Mart’s fiscal 
year ended January 31, 2009 to have coincided with the 2008 calendar year. 
 26. See FT Global 500: Market Values and Prices, FIN. TIMES, 1 (Dec. 31, 2008), 
http://media.ft.com/cms/b5e2c024-dd89-11dd-930e-000077b07658.pdf. 
 27. See Walmart: A Leader in Logistics, WALMARTSTORES.COM, 1 (May 2009), 
http://walmartstores.com/download/2336.pdf. 
 28. Wal-Mart Form 10-K 2009, supra note 18, at 3–9; WAL-MART 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, 
supra note 21, at 55. 
 29. Wal-Mart Form 10-K 2009, supra note 18, at 11; WAL-MART 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, 
supra note 21, at 2. 
 30. See Wal-Mart Corporate Facts, supra note 16, at 2. 
 31. Wal-Mart Form 10-K 2009, supra note 18, at 3. 
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firm32—of a private enterprise that can lay claim to being the largest-scale 
and most efficient human-built real-time supply-chain operation that ever 
existed. 
If, for a moment, one only focuses on Wal-Mart’s 2008 net sales as a 
benchmark and compares those net sales on a dollar-for-dollar basis, the 
staggering result is that Wal-Mart concentrated in such fiscal year an 
economic productivity which equaled approximately 2.8% of the 2008 
gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States.33 In other words: all it 
took in 2008 were fewer than thirty-six companies the size of Wal-Mart to 
eclipse the entire productivity of the United States—the nation with the 
highest productivity in the world34—as measured by gross domestic 
product.35 And the entire human productive output of our planet—as 
measured in 2008 world GDP by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—
was the equivalent of only 151 Wal-Marts.36 The 2008 net revenues 
generated by Wal-Mart exceeded the individual 2008 GDPs of OECD 
member countries like Greece, Denmark, Ireland or Portugal, respectively.37 
Wal-Mart’s 2008 productivity matched the combined aggregated GDPs of 
the bottom seventy-three countries of the 181 national economies ranked by 
the IMF according to gross domestic productivity in 2008.38 If Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. were a nation state, it would have been the twenty-sixth largest 
national economy in the world in 2008.39 Thus, for a private enterprise, 
Wal-Mart concentrates and wields vast amounts of economic and 
sociopolitical power while it distributes vast amounts of economic wealth 
                                                                                                                           
 32. For a description of the concept of the ‘hub firm’ used by economists in order to describe 
what lawyers would usually call the top holding company in a corporate group, see generally 
Bernard Baudry & David Gindis, The V-Network Form: Economic Organization and the Theory 
of the Firm (Oct. 10, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=795244. 
 33. The 2008 U.S. GDP was $14,264.6 billion. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross Domestic Product: First Quarter 2009 (Final) / Corporate 
Profits: First Quarter 2009 (Revised), Table 3 (June 25, 2009), http://www.bea.gov/ 
newsreleases/national/gdp/2009/pdf/gdp109f.pdf. Wal-Mart’s $ 401.2 billion net sales in fiscal 
2008 divided by $14,264.6 billion equals approximately 0.2812557 (or 2.812557%). 
 34. See World Economic Outlook Database April 2009, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2011) 
[hereinafter World Economic Outlook Database] (listing relevant information that may be 
downloaded in spreadsheet form). 
 35. 100% (i.e., all of the 2008 U.S. GDP) divided by 2.8125569% (i.e., Wal-Mart’s 
comparative productivity in fiscal 2008 measured by net sales) equals approximately 
35.55483549. 
 36. The 2008 world GDP, as measured by the IMF, was $60,689.812 billion. World Economic 
Outlook Database, supra note 34. Wal-Mart’s $401.2 billion net sales in fiscal 2008 divided by 
$60,689.812 billion equals approximately 0.00661066 (or 0.661066%). 100% (i.e., all of the 2008 
world GDP) divided by 0.661066% (i.e., Wal-Mart’s comparative productivity in fiscal 2008 
measured by net sales) equals approximately 151.27071785. 
 37. World Economic Outlook Database, supra note 34. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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as well as vast amounts of social costs.40 As an inevitable result, “the ugly 
problem of political legitimacy raises its head.”41 
Given this economic megapolity, the core question, thus, becomes: 
where do the legal fiction of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.—seemingly innocently, 
as if a mere formality, and ephemerally created and existing under 
Delaware corporate law42—and the economic reality of Wal-Mart’s global 
                                                                                                                           
 40. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 352 (arguing that large public corporations were 
competing with and threatening to supplant the modern state as the dominant form of social 
organization because of their “concentration of power in the economic field comparable to the 
concentration of religious power in the mediaeval church or of political power in the national 
state”). 
 41. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 604 n.21. See also Gilson, 
Separation and Function, supra note 6 (pointing out that “markets encourage a management and 
governance structure that fits the corporation’s business” and that “[c]orporate law has nothing to 
add to the process”); Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra note 6 (arguing that “the doctrine of 
‘social responsibility’ involves the acceptance of the socialist view that political mechanisms, not 
market mechanisms, are the appropriate way to determine the allocation of scarce resources to 
alternative uses”). Cf. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 18 (Reinier 
Kraakman et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?] (“As a 
normative matter, the overall objective of corporate law—as of any branch of law—is presumably 
to serve the interest of society as a whole.”); Mitchell, Trust and Team Production, supra note 12, 
at 870 (describing the understanding of corporate organization in terms of team production not 
only as a “tale . . . of economics alone” but also as “to conceive of the corporation as a political 
institution” and “as a social institution”); Randall S. Thomas, What is Corporate Law’s Place in 
Promoting Societal Welfare?: An Essay in Honor of Professor William Klein, 2 BERKELEY BUS. 
L.J. 135, 135 (2005) (“It strikes me that the overall goal of good corporate law should be to assist 
private parties to create wealth for themselves and the economy in a manner that does not inflict 
uncompensated negative externalities upon third parties.”); Steven M.H. Wallman, Understanding 
the Purpose of a Corporation: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 807, 809–10 (1999) [hereinafter 
Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation] (concluding that corporate governance must be aimed at 
maximizing “societal wealth over the long term”). To me, it is not clear what should be “ugly” 
about this problem, other than that it perhaps taints the (perceived or aspired) purity and sanctity 
of corporate theoretical models. I would simply argue that a pure (i.e., non-normative) corporate 
law (or any law for that matter) does not—and, because it is a complete human fiction anyhow, 
logically cannot—exist. The perceived ‘ugliness’ may, therefore, have more to do with personal 
attitudes and preferences (and I mean this only descriptively); some observers simply may “get 
real ‘squirrelly,’” Lawrence Raful, What Balance in Legal Education Means to Me: A Dissenting 
View, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 135, 135 (2010), when they hear what must sound to them as being 
“diffuse” and “confusing” at best, cf. Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust and Economic 
Organization, 36 J.L. & ECON. 453, 469 (1993), or as being “new age stuff” at worst, cf. Raful, 
supra. See also Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis 
of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001) (“More than one commentator has speculated that the 
disappearance of limits in macroeconomics serves as a theoretical expedient to avoid difficult 
questions of distribution.”); Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder 
Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 575 (2006) (“The terms ‘morality’ and ‘justice’ may raise red 
flags for readers skeptical of deontology and inclined toward consequentialism.”); Lawrence E. 
Mitchell, Understanding Norms, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 177, 203 (1999) (“Norms are fuzzy because 
people are fuzzy and life is fuzzy.”) (footnote omitted); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and 
Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1996) (“Norms are fuzzy.”). 
 42. The legal fiction of a corporation in corporate law (whether in Delaware as in the case of 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. or in other jurisdictions within the United States and internationally) is 
created and governed by three discrete categories or sources of law: (i) the ‘internal’ law of the 
corporation itself set forth in its so-called constituent or charter documents (certificate or articles 
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productive empire intersect (if not, collide)? And the answer may be: within 
what can be described as the dichotomous dimensions of corporate legal 
theory.43 These dichotomies provide American corporate law with a 
principal range of ultimately dialectic jurisprudential foundations which 
collectively translate the real world of Wal-Mart’s business enterprise into 
what appears to be a rather simple and straight-forward legal construct—
namely, the corporate legal entity. 
This construct—as most everything else in American private law—is 
based on the acquired interest preferences of a libertarian, free-enterprise-
oriented society.44 It has evolved over time—as has arguably all of 
corporate law (often guided, even if unaware, by principles of transaction 
cost economics)45—in order to provide cost-efficient ‘prefab,’ ‘off-the-
rack’46 governance mechanisms designed to standardize the regulation and 
                                                                                                                           
of incorporation and by-laws); (ii) the applicable corporate code in the corporation’s jurisdiction 
of incorporation; and (iii) the corporate case law and legal precedents in the corporation’s 
jurisdiction of incorporation that either deal with the interpretation and application of the relevant 
internal law and/or corporate code provisions or otherwise supplement those provisions in the 
absence of any internal law or code guidance. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra 
note 4, at 7 n.1; Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 5. 
 43. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1403–04 (pointing out the dichotomy 
between a positivistic, utilitarian, rules-bound worldview of corporate law and a flexible, 
moralistic, standard-based one); Millon, supra note 4, at 201 (describing three 
dimensions/dichotomies as relevant to theories of the corporation: (i) corporation as an entity 
versus corporation as an aggregation of individuals without separate existence; (ii) corporation as 
an “artificial creation of state law” versus “corporation as a natural product of private initiative”; 
and (iii) corporate law as a subject of public interest concerns versus corporate law governing 
solely the private relations between owners and managers). 
 44. Cf. O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4. The classical and then 
neoclassical economic position is that the political, economic, and legal systems need to provide 
(i) strong legal protection of the entrepreneur’s property right to own and control productive 
assets, as well as (ii) strict limits on the power of state actors to regulate and control economic 
activity. Cf. Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 141, 159–60 
(1988). 
 45. The field of transaction cost economics (TCE), a part of new institutional economics 
(NIE), was developed by Oliver Williamson (who also coined the term ‘new institutional 
economics’). See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS]; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, 
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); Oliver E. Williamson, Introduction, in THE 
NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 3 (Oliver E. Williamson & 
Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The 
Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979); Oliver E. Williamson, 
Transaction Cost Economics Meets Posnerian Law and Economics, 149 J. INST. & THEORETICAL 
ECON. 99 (1993); Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization?, in THE 
ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS (Francesco Parisi & 
Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005). See also Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 
1399; Rudolf Richter, The New Institutional Economics: Its Start, Its Meaning, Its Prospects, 6 
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 161, 163–65, 174–75 (2005) (discussing the development of NIE by 
Oliver Williamson). 
 46. COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, at 42; Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5; 
Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 559; Michael Klausner, The Contractarian 
Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 783 (2006). 
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solution of irreducible interest conflicts which define the corporate 
endeavor,47 in particular, in its publicly held variant with widely-dispersed 
shareownership and an almost complete separation of ownership and 
control.48 
In its continued evolution, the construct of the Berle-Means 
corporation—both as a legal entity and as an economic concentration of 
productive resources in the form of specific investments of dozens of 
different firm constituencies—is a priori forced to navigate among, and 
wrestle with, irradicable and irreducible dialectic dichotomies. Those 
include—a minore ad majus: 
 the fundamental agency problem of managerial primacy (the 
allocation of control with, and the resultant discretion of, 
corporate decisionmakers) and shareholder/stakeholder primacy 
(the allocation of controlling property and/or contract rights with, 
and the resultant accountability to, specific firm participants);49 
                                                                                                                           
 47. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 3–4; COX & HAZEN, supra note 4; 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY 
OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 21, 22 (Reinier Kraakman 
et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman, Agency Problems]. 
 48. See Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 923 
(1984) [hereinafter Romano, Metapolitics]. See also BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 
4, at 3–4 (“The conflicts of interest created by [the] separation of ownership and control drive 
much of corporate law . . . .”); BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 6 
(discussing the effects of the separation of ownership and control under the heading “The Central 
Problem of Corporate Governance”); Alces, supra note 4, at 787 (describing the separation of 
ownership and control and the resultant agency cost problem as “a central concern of the law of 
corporate governance”); O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4 (stating that 
the “central problem of the modern corporation” is found in its “separation of ownership and 
control”); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 
737, 740 (1997) (“The essence of the agency problem is the separation of management and 
finance, or—in more standard terminology—of ownership and control.”). The separation of 
ownership and control as the defining, characteristic notion of (most) public corporations was first 
thoroughly described by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4. But see 
KNIGHT, supra note 4 (“The typical form of business unit in the modern world is the corporation. 
Its most important characteristic is the combination of diffused ownership with concentrated 
control.”). See also BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4; COX & HAZEN, supra note 4; 
Bratton, Century’s Turn, supra note 4; Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4; Millon, supra 
note 4; O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4. 
 49. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 207 (2002) 
(“Establishing the proper mix of discretion and accountability . . . emerges as the central corporate 
governance question.”) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS]; Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 84 
(2004) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine]; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team 
Production in Business Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743, 743 (1999) 
[hereinafter Blair & Stout, Team Production] (describing the agency cost problem of monitoring 
managers and motivating them to act as faithful agents as “the central economic problem to be 
faced in a public corporation” for those following the principal-agent model of the firm); Dooley, 
supra note 11, at 524–25; Darian M. Ibrahim, Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate 
Directors?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 929, 947–48 (2008); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. 
Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 185, 188–89 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) 
[hereinafter Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process.]; Pinto, supra note 4, at 266; Larry E. Ribstein, 
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 shareholder wealth (maximum market value) and stakeholder 
welfare (maximum societal value);50 
 market and hierarchy;51 
 Aristotelean notions of rectification (corrective justice) and 
fairness (distributive justice);52 
 market liberalism (private liberty) and utilitarianism (social 
utility);53 and 
 the dialectics between the private/internal/market and the 
public/external/regulatory spheres of institutional power over the 
governance of the corporation (market and polity).54 
The first two dichotomies are what can be termed ‘microdichotomies’ 
because they inhere in corporate law and corporate law only. In contrast 
thereto, the remaining four dichotomies can be described as 
‘macrodichotomies.’ They are present in all areas of private law, including 
corporate law.55 
In what aims to be an essentially descriptive (i.e., positive rather than 
normative) account, Part II.A. of this Article will trace the first two dialectic 
                                                                                                                           
Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 198 (2004) [hereinafter Ribstein, Why 
Corporations?]; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 48, at 742–44. 
 50. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264–65 (1992) [hereinafter Allen, Schizophrenic Conception]; Jill E. 
Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 
637, 639–40 (2006); Gilson, Separation and Function, supra note 6, at 143 (stating that “the 
criteria for good corporate law are limited to a single overriding goal: facilitating the 
maximization of shareholder wealth”); Hansmann & Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, supra 
note 41; Mitchell, Trust and Team Production, supra note 12, at 870; Thomas, supra note 41; 
Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41. See also Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s 
Treatise, supra note 3, at 599 (describing as a critical fact for the intellectual vigor of corporate 
law that “all of the interesting and challenging issues involve the resolution of conflicts between 
corporate participants”). 
 51. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS, supra note 45; Oliver 
E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 65, 73 (1988) (arguing 
that is “necessary to identify and describe the principal governance structures—firms, market, 
hybrid modes—to which transactions might feasibly be assigned”). See also Meurer, supra note 9, 
at 729–30; Powell, supra note 8, at 297; Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power, supra note 
8, at 1631; Baudry & Gindis, supra note 32, at 1. 
 52. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of 
Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 194–95 (2000); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a 
Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 349 (2002); Ernest J. Weinrib, Liberty, Community, and 
Corrective Justice, 1 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3, 4–5 (1988); Richard W. Wright, The 
Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1859, 1868, 1889–92 (2000). 
 53. See, e.g., Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1396; Romano, Metapolitics, 
supra note 48, at 926. 
 54. See, e.g., Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 549; Bratton, Century’s Turn, 
supra note 4, at 760–61; Millon, supra note 4, at 202; Richter, supra note 45, at 177 (describing 
Douglass North’s concept of new institutional economics of history as aiming “at a general theory 
of the interaction between polity and economy”). 
 55. More precisely, the third dichotomy, market and hierarchy, is a hybrid realm in that it 
evidences both micro- and macrodichotomous characteristics. 
352 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 5 
dichotomies: discretion vs. accountability,56 and market value vs. societal 
value.57 Both, as microdichotomies, fundamentally inform current corporate 
theory (and, thus, the genius of American corporate law). They represent 
the main, overarching focal points of corporate governance—as well as of 
most of today’s debate in corporate legal theory. Both correspond with 
attempts to answer two deceptively simple, but fundamentally elusive and, 
therefore, at least partially unanswered questions of corporate governance 
(the first such question is, in essence, a procedural and positive question; 
the second a substantive and normative one):58 
1.“Who Control(s)?”; and 
2.“Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”. 
We have come a long way since the time that the governance and inner 
workings of corporate entities were regarded as a kind of ‘black box’ (in the 
sense of observable inputs, ‘hidden inner magic,’ observable outputs, and 
end of story).59 We have also come a long way since the thrust of corporate 
law has been equated to “towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally 
welded together and containing nothing but wind.”60 We have come to 
                                                                                                                           
 56. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 57. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 58. See BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 10; Bainbridge, The Means 
and Ends, supra note 3, at 549–50 (asking “(1) as to the means of corporate governance, who 
holds ultimate decisionmaking power? and (2) as to the ends of corporate governance, whose 
interests should prevail?”). See also CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 690 (“Who 
decides how the corporation’s general purpose is to be accomplished?”); Margaret M. Blair & 
Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 
WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 408 (2001) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Director Accountability] (asking “(1) 
what the law requires of directors, (2) whose interests boards should serve, and (3) how boards 
actually work”). 
 59. Cf. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1398 (stating that, until recently, 
“the internal operation of corporate actors was no more interesting than the internal operation of 
human actors”); Meurer, supra note 9, at 729–30 (describing the original theories of Coase and 
Williamson as treating the firm “like a black box in which authority avoids transaction costs” and 
concluding that “[m]odern research on the firm opens up the black box and gives a better account 
of how firms are organized and the costs and benefits of firm governance”); O’Kelley, Theory of 
the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 757 (stating that the firm is a ‘black box’ in classical 
and neoclassical perfect competition theory); Powell, supra note 8, at 296 (describing the 
paradigm shift developed by Ronald Coase in 1937, conceiving of the firm as a governing 
structure, thus, “breaking with orthodox accounts of the firm as a ‘black box’ production 
function”); Stone, supra note 17, at 8 (claiming that regulatory enforcement intervention imposes 
direct and selective constraints on how investors and managers work out various internal firm 
relationships and the ‘black box’ prerogative of the enterprise’s interior is, thus, overcome). 
 60. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 
YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962). See also Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in 
Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006) (stating that corporate law scholarship was 
“[v]irtually nontheoretical until the mid-1970s”); O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, 
supra note 4, at 763 (stating that after the Berle-Means era, “corporation law scholarship, if not 
‘dead,’ was certainly viewed as an intellectual backwater”); Romano, Metapolitics, supra note 48 
(confirming that “[u]ntil recently, corporate law has been an uninspiring field for research even to 
some of its most astute students.”). 
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regard and explore—as the central objective function of corporate law61—
its need to provide an efficient governance system for the internal 
functionality of the incorporated firm which allows such firm to survive and 
prosper (i.e., the formerly ‘hidden inner magic’).62 
For the firm to be able to do just that (i.e., to survive and prosper), the 
corporate governance system must: (i) allocate authority for making 
adaptive decisions on behalf of the firm within some (core) group of 
decisionmakers (thus, answering the question “Who Control(s)?”);63 and (ii) 
if at all possible, define the norms and interests that should guide such 
internal decisionmakers in their decisionmaking (thus, solving the question 
“Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”).64 
In order for the firm to be able to do so efficaciously65 and with 
continued success of adaptation, survival, and prosperity (in other words, in 
order to assure firm sustainability), the corporate governance system must 
provide a framework that allows the firm to unceasingly strive to achieve an 
optimal dynamic equilibrium66—both: (a) among competing interests of 
firm participants (for example, shareholders, directors, managers, 
employees, unions, customers, financial creditors, suppliers, etc.)—again, if 
such balancing is possible (and, in particular, ex ante predictable);67 and (b) 
between discretion and accountability of firm management (i.e., the 
decisionmakers).68 Put differently, the corporate governance system needs 
                                                                                                                           
 61. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 611. 
 62. Cf. Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 552; Rock & Wachter, Islands of 
Conscious Power, supra note 8, at 1622. 
 63. Cf. Dooley, supra note 11, at 466; Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A 
Multi-Dimensional Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 97, 127–28 (2009) (discussing the treatment of the corporation’s internal decision structure 
(CID Structure) as developed by philosopher Peter French in PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE 
AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY ch. 4 (1984) and Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral 
Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 211 (1979)). 
 64. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 10, 21; CLARK, 
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 690; Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5; 
Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 552; Dooley, supra note 11, at 466. See also 
Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power, supra note 8 (explaining that a “theory of the firm 
can also help us figure out . . . the role the law plays in facilitating or interfering with solutions 
[among firm participants]”). 
 65. Regarding my preference for the term ‘efficaciousness’ over ‘efficiency’ in this context, 
which captures the idea of a corporate governance structure that has the power to produce 
efficiencies over time and under ever-changing circumstances, see Richter, supra note 45, at 175. 
 66. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 599 (describing the interactions 
of firm participants “in equilibirium” within the corporate firm which involves the ongoing 
“resolution of conflicts between corporate participants”); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic 
Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of 
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 27 (1991). 
 67. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 599. 
 68. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. See also KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF 
ORGANIZATION 78 (1974) [hereinafter ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION] (“If every 
decision of A is to be reviewed by B, then all we have really is a shift in the locus of authority 
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to balance and reconcile (i) the need to protect each group of firm 
participants from potential downside risks created by opportunistic behavior 
of other groups of firm participants,69 and (ii) the need to encourage firm 
managers to act as entrepreneurs and to incur operational risks in order to 
increase firm value outputs. It is in this regard that we are talking about the 
central agency (cost) problem of the modern public corporation as the 
logical result of its separation of ownership and control.70 But the problem 
(and the academic inquiry into such problem), by necessity, has been 
broadening for a long time.71 Corporate decisionmakers must be seen, at 
least functionally, as economic agents aiming (and maybe even charged) to 
serve and benefit the welfare of all of the firm’s participants, not only its 
shareholders.72 
My first conclusion—developed in Part II of this Article—to the two 
fundamental questions of “Who Control(s)?” and “Whose Interest(s) 
Control(s)?” is that, for the former question, we have arrived at a fairly 
                                                                                                                           
from A to B and hence no solution to the original problem.”); BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 11. 
  Neither discretion nor accountability can be ignored because both promote values 
essential to the survival of business organizations. Unfortunately, they are ultimately 
antithetical: one cannot have more of one without also having less of the other. At some 
point, directors cannot be made more accountable without undermining their 
discretionary authority. 
Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 573 (footnote omitted); Dooley, supra note 11, 
at 470. 
 69. See Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 746. 
 70. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 3–4; id. at 75 (“Much of 
corporate law is best understood as a mechanism for containing . . . agency costs.”); COX & 
HAZEN, supra note 4; Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn 
A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1735, 1807 (2001) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Trust]; Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate 
Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 B.U. L. REV. 157, 177 (1970); Hansmann & Kraakman, 
Agency Problems, supra note 47; Millon, supra note 4, at 221; Marcel Kahan, The Limited 
Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1877–78 (2001); 
O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4; Rock & Wachter, Islands of 
Conscious Power, supra note 8, at 1624; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 48, at 740–48 (discussing 
the agency problem as the central problem of corporate governance). See also Richter, supra note 
45, at 179 (stating that the central problem of Williamsonian transaction cost economics is ex-post 
opportunism). 
 71. The problem, arguably, has been broadening since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means 
published THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY in 1932. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, 
THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 4–5 (describing Berle and Means’ treatise as “what still 
may be the most influential book ever written about corporations”); Romano, Metapolitics, supra 
note 48, at 923 (describing the same as the “last major work of original scholarship”). 
 72. See, e.g., Gilson, Separation and Function, supra note 6, at 146 (observing that “one 
cannot run a successful business without taking seriously the role of non-shareholders whose 
contributions are important to the corporation’s success”); Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, 
supra note 3, at 604 n.21 (acknowledging that distributional/allocational concerns are underlying 
central board functions, at least within the Blair/Stout Team Production Model discussed infra). 
See also supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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good idea of an answer in the form of partially overlapping73 director 
primacy models developed by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout74 on the one 
hand, and Stephen Bainbridge75 on the other. It seems evident from those 
director primacy models that the maxim of corporate law with regard to the 
first (procedural) question of corporate governance is to establish 
centralized, autocratic decisionmaking within the corporate structure.76 
Indeed, corporate law squarely situates the board of directors at the very top 
of a hierarchical, centralist command-and-control structure that controls the 
corporate business and affairs.77 However, when we approach the second 
                                                                                                                           
 73. Professor Bainbridge acknowledges that his director primacy model partially overlaps with 
the Blair/Stout Team Production Model when he states that such “team production model 
somewhat resembl[es] director primacy, but also differ[s] from director primacy in key respects.” 
Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 551. 
 74. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, 
Specific Investment and Corporate Law, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 473 (2006) [hereinafter Blair 
& Stout, Specific Investment]; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: 
Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719 (2006) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, 
Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law]; Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49; 
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 247 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Corporate Law]; Blair & Stout, Trust, supra note 70, 
at 1735. See generally Stephanie Ben-Ishai, A Team Production Theory of Canadian Corporate 
Law, 44 ALBERTA L. REV. 299 (2006); Allen Kaufman & Ernie Englander, A Team Production 
Model of Corporate Governance, ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Aug. 2005, at 9; Lynn M. LoPucki, 
A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 57 VAND. L. REV. 741, 743 (2004); 
Alan J. Meese, Essay, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629 (2002); Mitchell, Trust and Team Production, supra note 12; D. 
Gordon Smith, Team Production in Venture Capital Investing, 24 J. CORP. L. 949 (1999). See 
infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the Blair/Stout team production model). 
 75. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 49; BAINBRIDGE, 
THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus 
of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts]; Bainbridge, 
Abstention Doctrine, supra note 49; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder 
Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting 
Rights]; Bainbridge, Just Say No, supra note 7; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and 
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, 
Shareholder Disempowerment]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate 
Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, 
Corporate Takeovers]; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3; Bainbridge, Convergence 
Debate, supra note 2; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors’ Fiduciary 
Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 335 (2007) [hereinafter Bainbridge, 
Much Ado About Little]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate 
Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group 
Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, 
Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance]. See also Ribstein, Why Corporations?, supra 
note 49, at 196–98. See generally Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian 
Moment: A Review of The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 139 (2009). See infra Part II.A.4 (discussing the Bainbridge director primacy model). 
 76. Cf. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 21; Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical 
and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 95 (2004) 
[hereinafter Gevurtz, Origins of the Corporate Board]; O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern 
Corporation, supra note 4, at 756. 
 77. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (West 2010) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
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(substantive) question of corporate governance, my views move into starker 
contrast with the two director primacy models as currently developed. The 
Blair/Stout team production model78 insists that the board of directors 
remains somehow accountable to the productive team and all of its 
participants—namely as a ‘trustee’ and ‘fiduciary’ to whom team members 
have ceded control.79 The Bainbridge director primacy model assumes that 
the same shareholder wealth maximization principle employed in 
shareholder primacy models80 must remain the fundamental norm in order 
                                                                                                                           
directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of 
incorporation.”); REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1984) (“All corporate powers shall be 
exercised by or under the authority of the board of directors of the corporation, and the business 
and affairs of the corporation managed by or under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of 
its board of directors . . . .”); BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 3, 72, 74 (“[T]he 
board is at the apex of the corporate hierarchy . . . .”); COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, at 149 (“A 
corporation’s board of directors is legally the supreme authority in matters of the corporation’s 
regular business management.”) (footnote omitted); Gevurtz, Origins of the Corporate Board, 
supra note 76, at 92–94; Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of the Corporate Directors (Or, 
Why You Don’t Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2 
(2003) [hereinafter Stout, Proper Motives]. 
  It should be noted that, in practice, most operational decisions—both day-to-day decisions 
as well as many long-term policy decisions—are taken by corporate officers and other senior-
management employees of the corporation pursuant to authority delegated by the board of 
directors. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 73, 89; COX & HAZEN, supra 
note 4, at 136. Often, the corporation’s chief executive officer (CEO) must be seen as the principal 
decisionmaker of the corporation. See O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, 
at 756. The absolute director primacy model developed in this Article includes all decisionmakers, 
including all officers of the corporation as well as its senior management employees, whose 
decisionmaking authority is derivative from the original and sui generis decisionmaking power 
granted to the board of directors by state corporation statutes. Such inclusive treatment of officers 
and senior management employees correlates with the legal constraints established by corporate 
law for purposes of director accountability, namely fiduciary duties, which are also applied by 
state corporation statutes to corporate officers, and by agency law rules to senior management 
employees, in a similar fashion. Finally, under the preferred board model in the United States, it is 
also of significance in this regard that the CEO regularly functions in a dual capacity: both as the 
most senior officer of the corporation and as the chairman of the corporation’s board of directors. 
Thus, the CEO—and often many other senior officers of the corporation—is a (inside) board 
director in the first place. Notwithstanding this proliferation and delegation of corporate 
decisionmaking power, it has been said that “[i]n today’s business environment, the buck 
ultimately stops in the boardroom, not the corner office.” Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 
3. Accordingly, I feel justified to commingle the director and officer/management spheres of 
decisionmaking and, therefore, to solely focus on director decisionmaking behavior for purposes 
of this Article. See Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 299 n.2. 
 78. The Blair/Stout team production model can be seen as a progeny of the seminal article by 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling in 1976 that “accelerated the deconstruction of the 
corporation.” Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 599; Jensen & Meckling, 
supra note 17, at 305. 
 79. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 425 (fiduciary); Blair & Stout, 
Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 291 (“In the eyes of the law, corporate directors are a unique 
form of fiduciary who, to the extent they resemble any other form, perhaps most closely resemble 
trustees.”) (footnote omitted); Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 746 (trustee). See 
also Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE 
L.J. 879, 880 (stating that “directors occupy a trustee-like position”). 
 80. See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the shareholder primacy model). 
2011] Deconstructing Corporate Governance 357 
to guide—and to constrain where necessary—the ultimate decisionmaker 
(i.e., the board of directors).81 
I am convinced otherwise. My second conclusion, developed in Part II 
of this Article, therefore posits that a satisfactory answer to the second, 
substantive question of corporate governance (“Whose Interest(s) 
Control(s)?”) remains indeterminable within current models of corporate 
theory—in particular when today’s variant theoretical constructs of the 
corporate form are ‘marred’ with a realistic and pragmatic82 (i.e., not 
aspirationally or doctrinally oriented) analysis of American corporate law as 
it is currently ‘on the books.’83 In my view, nothing within corporate law—
whether conceptualized and phrased as property rights or as ‘contractual’84 
interests—seems to achieve a meaningful modicum of predictive ability85 
for decisionmaker behavior ex ante and, thus, inherent therein, 
                                                                                                                           
 81. Bainbridge, Convergence Debate, supra note 2, at 48; Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, 
supra note 75; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 551, 592; Bainbridge, 
Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 75. See also O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern 
Corporation, supra note 4, at 756 n.19. 
 82. It has been stated in a somewhat different context that “[c]orporate law at its heart is an 
exercise in pragmatism, . . . a device not a model.” Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra 
note 3, at 600. It should be noted, however, that most devices are usually designed and built after 
some modeling. 
 83. Cf. Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at 809, 813–14. 
 84. The nexus-of-contracts (or contractarian) theory of the firm developed by economists, see 
infra Part II.A.2, uses the words ‘contract’ and ‘contractual’ in a broader sense to include “non-
consensual rational economic relationships” that are premised on implicit, self-governing 
arrangements between firm participants which do not constitute actual contracts in the legal sense. 
See, e.g., HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 24, at 330; Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 
75, at 10–11; Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 822–23; Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power, 
supra note 8, at 1640–41; Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, supra note 5, at 1613. 
Accordingly, within this Article I indicate such broader contractarian use of the words ‘contract’ 
and ‘contractual’ by enclosing them in single quotation marks. 
 85. Predictive ability and accuracy is, of course, the main criterion by which positive 
(descriptive) economic models are evaluated. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS 11–12 (1953) (“But economic theory must be more than a structure of tautologies if 
it is to be able to predict and not merely describe the consequences of action; if it is to be 
something different from disguised mathematics.”) (footnote omitted). 
  Positive economics submits itself to the rigor of scientific method. Submission means 
that the model’s value is to be judged not only by its internal consistency and adherence 
to accepted principles, but also by its ability to predict the occurrence of events in the 
real world. It must be possible to derive from the model behavioral implications, at least 
some of which must be empirically falsifiable and therefore testable. 
Fred S. McChesney, Book Review Essay, Positive Economics and All That—A Review of the 
Economics Structure of Corporate Law by Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 61 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 272, 278 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)); McChesney, The “Trans Union” Case, 
supra note 2; O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 755, 757. See also 
BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 2–3; Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, 
supra note 75, at 1; Bainbridge, Just Say No, supra note 7; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance 
of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 591, 596 (2001) [hereinafter Mitchell, Importance of Being 
Trusted]. 
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accountability of decisionmakers ex post. There is no quantum of control in 
corporate law which would ensure the general inviolability of any firm 
participant interest at any given point in time. Put differently—whether we 
like it or not—a disinterested corporate board is uncontrollable in absolute 
terms within the law.86 
In this regard, the business judgment rule87—applied ex post88—can be 
viewed as a decided refusal by corporate law to provide model-immanent 
meaning to the second, substantive question of corporate governance.89 
Obviously, there are market mechanisms ex post90 that do address agency 
                                                                                                                           
 86. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 226 (“In practice, however, cases in 
which the business judgment rule does not shield operational decisions from judicial review are so 
rare as to amount to little more than aberrations.”); Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power, 
supra note 8, at 1623 (describing the business judgment rule as “assuring that enforcement [of the 
duty of care] is almost entirely nonlegal”); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 6 (“The 
business judgment rule . . . allows a director who makes even a minimal effort to become 
‘informed’ to make foolhardy decisions all day long, without fear of liability.”); id. at 7 (“[I]t is 
only a slight exaggeration to suggest that a corporate director is statistically more likely to be 
attacked by killer bees than she is to have to ever pay damages for breach of the duty of care.”). 
 87. The business judgment rule—as the central instrument of judicial review of alleged 
violations of director fiduciary duties (care, loyalty, obligation of good faith)—operates as a 
presumption (whether in the form of a standard of review or in the form of a judicial abstention 
doctrine) that “in making a business decision the directors of a corporation have acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests 
of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). See, e.g., Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812); BAINBRIDGE, 
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 109–10; COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, at 184–85; STEPHEN A. 
RADIN, 1 THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 11–23 
(6th ed. 2009); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 6. 
 88. Cf. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1404 (stating that fiduciary duties 
tend to be analyzed in a “particularistic ex post style”). 
 89. Rock & Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power, supra note 8, at 1623 (describing the 
business judgment rule as “a jurisdictional rule that facilitates a self governing [norm-based] 
relationship by preventing parties from turning to third-party adjudicators” and “assuring that 
enforcement [of the duty of care] is almost entirely nonlegal”). See also BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE 
LAW, supra note 4, at 110 (concluding that pursuant to the effects of the business judgment rule, 
corporate directors are given a “carte blanche to make decisions that might turn out badly, but no 
discretion to make selfish decisions.”); Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 746 
(stating that, as a matter of law, corporate directors remain “insulated from the direct command 
and control of [shareholders] or any other corporate constituents”); Larry E. Ribstein, 
Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1470 
(2006) [hereinafter Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility]; Stout, Proper Motives, supra 
note 77, at 6 (stating that the business judgment rule “allows a director who makes even a minimal 
effort to become ‘informed’ to make foolhardy decisions all day long, without fear of liability”). 
 90. See, e.g., Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 562; Blair & Stout, Explaining 
Anomalies in Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 724; Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, supra note 74, 
at 252; Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability 
in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 119–20 (2006); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and 
the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POLITICAL ECON. 110, 112 (1965); Millon, supra note 4, 
at 230; Pinto, supra note 4, at 276–79. See generally Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, 
Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-
Making Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489 (1999). 
  These post-investment, corrective market mechanisms include, for example, (i) the so-
called market for corporate control or hostile-takeover market—which, of course, depends on the 
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costs in the form of wasteful managerial shirking and/or rent-seeking.91 
However, those after-the-fact correctives, in my judgment, do not help in 
any way with firm investments to be made confidently ex ante.92 And, from 
all we can tell, those investments are made—daily and literally millions of 
times over93—and with a good measure of predictive accuracy therefore 
allowing investor confidence and economic efficiency ex ante.94 
                                                                                                                           
general financial feasibility of corporate mergers and takeovers in a given economy and industry, 
see, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 74, (ii) product-market competition, 
see, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 75; COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, at 37; 
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6. J. 
LEGAL STUD. 251, 289 (1977), (iii) manager-market competition, see, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, 
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 75; COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, at 37, and (iv) shareholder 
activism by institutional and other investors with significant enough stockholdings (though there 
is much debate about the extent of which the ‘rational apathy phenomenon’ also applies to those 
large-scale investors), see, e.g., CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 390–92; Bernard S. 
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 524–25 (1990); Edward B. 
Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 
445 (1991); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance 
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 796 (1993); Robert D. Rosenbaum, Foundations of Sand: 
The Weak Premises Underlying the Current Push for Proxy Rule Changes, 17 J. CORP. L. 163 
(1991). Furthermore, monitoring costs are still high due to the limited transparency provided by 
only minimum forward-looking disclosure requirements under current federal securities rules. See, 
e.g., Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient Corporate Disclosure 
Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115, 128–36 (2009). See generally 
Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An 
Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493 (2005). 
 91. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 75; Allen, Contracts and 
Communities, supra note 5; Blair & Stout, Explaining Anomolies in Corporate Law, supra note 
74, at 763–71; Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 745; Stout, Proper Motives, 
supra note 77, at 5. 
 92. These correctives may help to encourage some normative agenda across the spectrum ex 
ante (and, thus, incentivize firm managements across the spectrum to comply with such agenda), 
but they do not help the particular investor who ends up with a particular, disincentivized or ‘non-
incentivizable’ firm management and who is forced to (financially) suffer through the corrective 
mechanism(s) coming to the ‘rescue’ in her particular case in an attempt by the market to 
reinforce the normative agenda across the spectrum. In other words, these correctives distribute 
highly inefficient monitoring costs asymmetrically. Unless our investor hedges against such 
particularized risk by a widely diversified portfolio, why would she confidently invest ex ante? 
See Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 795 (2007) 
(describing how stock, counter-intuitively, can become an illiquid investment “when exploited 
shareholders try to sell en masse”) [hereinafter Stout, Mythical Benefits]. 
 93. For example, the average daily trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
for NYSE-listed companies in 2009 totaled 7,982,926 trading transactions per diem, comprising 
an average of 2,179,775,581 shares traded for a total average consideration of $46,670,638,331. 
Daily NYSE Group Volume in NYSE Listed, 2009, NYSE FACT BOOK ONLINE, 
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=table&key=3002&cate 
gory=3 (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). See also Blair & Stout, Trust, supra note 70, at 1737. 
 94. Cf. Bainbridge, Just Say No, supra note 7; Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the 
Other? Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive 
Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255, 257 (2005) (“To induce investors to buy stock ex ante, 
corporate governance law must be designed to give confidence that managers will seldom cheat 
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I believe that an absolute director primacy model as developed herein 
provides a clear answer to the procedural question of corporate governance 
(“Who Control(s)?”)—even though it is an answer that I suspect we may 
not like. At the same time, the absolute director primacy model should also 
free us from our fruitless searches for model-immanent (perhaps even law-
immanent) answers to the substantial control question of corporate 
governance (“Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”). In my view and quite 
plainly, there has to be ‘something’ else in order to explain the phenomenon 
of general investor confidence pre-investment in the face of absent manager 
accountability post-investment95—to explain why the genius of American 
corporate law, though elitist and autocratic, does not regularly also turn 
totalitarian, and why a board of directors, though uncontrollable within 
corporate law, does not regularly also turn out-of-control within corporate 
reality. In other words: I believe that we have not (yet) solved the second, 
substantive question: “Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”. And I have a strong 
intuition that what we are really looking for—the so far elusive ‘something’ 
else—is not only exogenous96 (i.e., situated outside of current 
microtheoretical models of the firm), but is essentially protolegal.97 In this 
                                                                                                                           
and that when they do cheat they will generally be detected and punished.”); William Klein, 
Criteria for Good Laws of Business Association, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 13, 16 (2005). 
 95. Cf. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 8 (asking why directors “seem to mostly live 
up to our trust”); id. at 9 (“Rational investors would never cede control of tens of trillions of 
dollars of assets to purely self-interested boards, given the tissue-paper thin protection offered by 
the rules of fiduciary duty, and the limits of social sanctions.”). 
 96. Cf. Oliver Hart, Norms and Theory of the Firm, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1701, 1702 (2001) 
[hereinafter Hart, Norms and Theory]. 
 97. Ingredients that are relevant variables in such protolegal context are, for example: trust; 
trustworthiness; loyalty; notions of public duty; responsibility; fairness; good faith; sense of 
morality; reputation; integrity; confidence. See, e.g., Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra 
note 5, at 1402 (trust, loyalty); Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 550–51 n.21 
(guardianship, duty); George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and 
Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1221 (2008) (trust); 
Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 306 (reputation, integrity); Hart, Norms and Theory, 
supra note 96 (honesty, trust); id. at 1703 (decency, fairness); id. at 1714 (reputation, 
trustworthiness); Mitchell, Trust and Team Production, supra note 12 (trust, loyalty, duty); 
O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 767 (integrity); id. at 769 
(confidence); Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, supra note 5, at 1608 (corporate 
culture); id. at 1609 (trust); id. at 1611 (credibility); id. at 1613 (reputation); Smith, supra note 74, 
at 969 (firm reputation); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 1 (altruism); id. at 7 (reputation); 
id. at 8–9 (sense of honor, responsibility, sense of obligation; integrity, trustworthiness); id. at 20 
(character). Good faith, loyalty (and, implicitly, trust and trustworthiness), and notions of duty—
as protolegal variables—are obviously all ingredients that have become heavily reflected in 
director fiduciary duties, i.e., in legal mandates imposed by corporate law. The law, however, is—
at best—still struggling with these variables. For example, see the recent difficulties encountered 
by the Delaware Supreme Court attempting to wrestle down some positive, definitional meaning 
of ‘good faith’ in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006), and Stone v. 
Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). It is, thus, helpful to remind oneself that, in economic parlance, 
protolegal variables may turn out to be “observable, but not verifiable.” See Hart, Norms and 
Theory, supra note 96. See also Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 419 
n.35; Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, supra note 5, at 1617. 
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maybe limited but significant regard, it can be said that we are still much 
more at the beginning of the history of corporate law than at its end.98 
II. MICROTHEORETICAL MODELS OF THE FIRM 
Microtheoretical models of the firm focus on the internal cohesion, 
adaptability, and survival of the firm as a generator and maximizer of 
productive output and economic wealth and, thus, largely ignore 
distributive concerns99—namely, whether the externalized costs of 
generating and maximizing economic wealth are fairly and effectively 
distributed100 and whether the resultant economic wealth itself is fairly and 
effectively distributed.101 Firm boundaries are sharp, removing firms from 
the larger societal context (including the market) like “islands of planned 
co-ordination in a sea of market relations.”102 Corporate control and the 
predictability of returns on firm-specific investments are the fundamental 
concerns. 
Two main and fully interdependent dichotomies are involved and 
exhaust the field both theoretically and practically. First, one of the 
fundamental agency (cost) problems of corporate law103 raises its head: 
“Who Control(s)?”. As has been discussed above, theory and practice here 
oscillate between manager primacy (i.e., the allocation of control with, and 
the resultant discretion of, corporate decisionmakers)104 and investor 
primacy (i.e., the allocation of controlling property and/or ‘contract’ rights 
                                                                                                                           
 98. See Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of History, supra note 2. See also Henry Hansmann, 
How Close is the End of History?, 31 J. CORP. L. 745 (2006); Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or 
the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 132–33 (2004). 
 99. Cf. Hansmann & Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, supra note 41; Mitchell, Trust and 
Team Production, supra note 12, at 870; Romano, Metapolitics, supra note 48, at 924; Wallman, 
Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41. See Garrett, supra note 14, at 137 (stating that the 
“nexus of contracts theory provides a basis for the director primacy theory and the shareholder 
primacy theory, both of which explain the balance of power within the corporation, rather than the 
role of corporations as participants in broader governance processes such as foreign relations, 
adjudication, and law making”). 
 100. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 824; Lee, supra note 41, at 538–39; Sheehy, supra 
note 15, at 3, 17–20. See also Thomas, supra note 41. 
 101. Cf. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1396 (discussing how the 
distribution of gains and losses is “a secondary concern” in the classical liberal economic model); 
Millon, supra note 4, at 201–02 (discussing the dichotomy between corporate law’s “external 
perspective, paying explicit regard to the relations between the corporation and the rest of society” 
on the one hand and “corporate law’s focus as internal, dealing primarily with the governance 
problems that arise inside the corporation” on the other hand). 
 102. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 103. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 104. It should be noted that the concept of ‘manager primacy’ is used here in a broader sense to 
include, most prominently, the board of directors. See discussion supra note 77. I do not mean to 
refer to managerialist models of the firm which were prevalent until the 1970s and 1980s. See, 
e.g., William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate 
Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 690 (2006); Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of 
History, supra note 2, at 444; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 2–3. 
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with, and the resultant accountability to, firm participants making specific 
investments into the corporate venture).105 Second, we have come to 
understand that this first dichotomy is strongly interdependent with a 
second inquiry: “Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”. Here, corporate practice 
and theory have developed a second dichotomy between shareholder/owner 
income (i.e., the goal of the corporate endeavor is to achieve maximum 
market value and, thus, is aimed at maximizing shareholder wealth at all 
cost) and stakeholder welfare (i.e., the goal of the firm is to achieve 
maximum societal value and, thus, is aimed at optimizing the respective 
distributive values of all firm participants and third parties involved by 
allocating resources and externalizing costs as fairly/efficiently as 
possible).106 
A. PLOTTING MODELS WITHIN MICRODICHOTOMIES 
Much of the basic modeling work has, of course, already been done by 
others. In his 2003 article on Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance,107 Stephen Bainbridge has also already developed 
the basic graphic framework for plotting the two microdichotomies of 
corporate law that are of interest here—namely the allocation of corporate 
decisionmaking power and the distribution of corporate value-creation 
benefits (as well as, inescapably, of value-creation costs).108 As far as I can 
tell, however, no one has used this graphic framework in order to also plot 
current microtheoretical models of the firm more systematically and in 
depth. Table 1 and the discussion that follows in this Part II.A. attempts 
such plotting task. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 105. It should be noted that interest asymmetries not only exist among various constituencies of 
firm participants (e.g., shareholders) but also within the same constituency of firm participants. 
Thus, for example, shareholders as a group will be looking at a return on their firm investment 
which is functionally discreet and different from other firm participants. But, at the same time, 
shareholders among each other will often have very different short-term or long-term targets on 
when and how they would like to achieve their individual returns on their respective firm 
investments. Similar intra-firm participant interest differentiations, of course, apply to employees, 
suppliers, customers, etc. 
 106. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 107. Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 548. See also BAINBRIDGE, 
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 49; BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 2; Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 49; Bainbridge, Corporate Takeovers, 
supra note 75; Bainbridge, Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, supra note 75; 
Bainbridge, Just Say No, supra note 7; Bainbridge, Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 
75; Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little, supra note 75; Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 
75. 
 108. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 599. 
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Figure 1: Plotting Corporate Microdichotomies109 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 describes the core conceptual framework. Table 1 
demonstrates how the four microtheoretical models of the firm which are at 
the center of today’s corporate theory debate110 can be plotted within Figure 
1 and, therefore, can be juxtaposed and compared to each other. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 109. Cf. Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 548. The author has received reprint 
permission for the original chart from Northwestern University School of Law, Northwestern 
University Law Review, which permission expressly includes the changes that have been made by 
the author to the original chart. 
 110. The main four models in today’s academic discussion can be labeled as ‘shareholder 
primacy,’ ‘contractarian,’ ‘team production,’ and ‘director primacy.’ See generally Bainbridge, 
Convergence Debate, supra note 2 (discussing shareholder-primacy and director-primacy 
models); John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable 
Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837 (1999) (discussing team-production models); 
Dent, Jr., supra note 97 (discussing team-production and director-primacy models); Fisch, supra 
note 50 (discussing shareholder-primacy models); Lee, supra note 41 (discussing shareholder 
primacy and team production models); J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes 
Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 315–26 (2010) (discussing all four 
models as well as “agency theory” and “progressive corporate law theory”). For a more general 
discussion of those firm models, see generally Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 819; O’Kelley, Theory 
of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 753–77; Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra 
note 41. 
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manager primacy 
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Table 1: Current Microtheoretical Models of the Firm 
 
Model “Who Controls?”  “Whose Interest(s) 
Control(s)?” 
Main Locus 
in Figure 1 
Shareholder 
Primacy 
board 
(by delegation of, 
and with 
accountability to, 
shareholders) 
shareholders 
(indirectly, all firm 
participants exert 
some influence 
since shareholders 
are residual 
claimants) 
Quadrant II 
Contractarian ‘nexus’ of explicit 
and implicit 
‘contracts’ 
(no individual 
group of firm 
participants 
controls) 
shareholders 
(indirectly, all firm 
participants exert 
some influence 
since shareholders 
are residual 
claimants) 
Quadrant II 
(with, 
perhaps, a 
bit of 
Quadrant 
IV) 
Team 
Production 
board 
(as a mediating 
hierarch by 
delegation of, and 
with accountability 
to, all firm 
participants) 
all firm participants 
(directly as a team) 
Quadrants 
II & IV 
Director 
Primacy 
board 
(as a decisionmaker 
by fiat) 
shareholders 
(indirectly, all firm 
participants exert 
some influence 
since shareholders 
are residual 
claimants) 
Quadrant I 
(with, 
perhaps, a 
bit of 
Quadrant 
II) 
 
Obviously, there are significant degrees of oversimplification involved 
in this plotting exercise but such is inevitable if one tries to gain any 
meaningful overview. Models are only as good as the reach of their 
conceptual and predictive wherewithal is far.111 They involve (if not, 
require) the breaking down of complexity and the reassembly of (complex) 
reality in more abstract but, thus, more manageable structural pieces.112 By 
necessity, models are different from reality—smaller, simpler, more limited 
                                                                                                                           
 111. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 2–3. 
 112. See Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 9. 
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than reality.113 But they aspire to replicate essential parts of reality, hence, 
to make reality explainable and predictable.114 All models discussed here 
venture to explain the reality of corporate governance. The (merely) 
narrative claims made in this Part II.A. are that: (i) some models are more 
accurate than others; and (ii) all models are (necessarily) incomplete in their 
attempt to answer the second microdichotomous question, “Whose 
Interest(s) Control(s)?”. 
1. The Shareholder Primacy Model 
Who Controls: Board (by delegation of, and with accountability to, 
shareholders as owners of the firm). 
Whose Interest(s) Control(s): Shareholders (indirectly, all firm 
participants exert some influence since shareholders are residual claimants). 
Main Locus: Quadrant II (shareholder interests control; board of 
directors/management is fully accountable). 
Description. It has been claimed that as a matter of norms, efficiency, 
and fact, the world of corporate law converges around the ‘standard’ 
shareholder-centered model of the business corporation.115 In this model, 
shareholder primacy describes and defines the maximization of shareholder 
wealth as the objective function, purpose, and controlling interest of the 
corporation.116 Thus, the only value we need in order to evaluate the 
fairness and efficiency of corporate law is a “uni-criterion”:117 shareholder 
gains. Shareholders are the residual owners (claimants) of the firm—they 
receive only what is left after every other claimant has been satisfied in 
full.118 As ultimate owners of the corporation, the corporation is their 
                                                                                                                           
 113. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 2–3; Bainbridge, Nexus of 
Contracts, supra note 75, at 9. In other words, models are constructions, and it is important to 
keep in mind that life (i.e., reality) is serial, not constructed. 
 114. Cf. HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 24, at 331. 
 115. Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of History, supra note 2, at 440–41. See also Blair & 
Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 744 (claiming that law professors have come to adopt 
the shareholder primacy model as “the dominant paradigm for understanding the modern 
corporate enterprise”); Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 601; Millon, supra 
note 4, at 224 (stating that “the shareholder primacy principle has been the fundamental postulate 
of corporate law”); Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at 807. 
 116. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962) [hereinafter 
MILTON, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM]; Bernhard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing 
Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1921 (1996) (“The efficiency goal of 
maximizing the company’s value to investors [is] . . . the principal function of corporate law.”); 
Gilson, Separation and Function, supra note 6, at 143; Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra 
note 6. See Allen, Schizophrenic Conception, supra note 50; Fisch, supra note 50. 
 117. Gilson, Separation and Function, supra note 6, at 143. 
 118. The equity investors of a firm (i.e., the shareholders in a corporation) are regarded as the 
firm’s residual claimants because all debt investors’ claims against the firm, once liquidated, have 
to be satisfied first before any remaining (i.e., residual) profits left after the firm’s obligations to 
debt investors have been paid may be distributed to the equity investors. In others words, 
shareholders are only entitled to the residuum of profits, if any, after everyone else has been paid. 
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‘property.’119 Therefore, their collectivized interest in the prosperity and 
survival of the firm is congruent and identical with the firm’s interest 
overall. Firm value is, ipso facto, shareholder value (and vice versa). In the 
words of the late economist and Nobel Laureate, Milton Friedman: 
[T]here is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long 
as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open 
and free competition without deception or fraud.120 
As a theoretical construct developed from neoclassical economic 
models, the shareholder primacy model carries significant strengths (as well 
as popularity among corporate scholars).121 It is logically created from the 
unbundling of firm ownership and firm control in the Berle-Means 
corporation,122 and neatly divides the playing field into only two groups of 
firm participants who matter: those whose interests control the corporate 
endeavor—namely, principals/owners/shareholders—and those who are 
controlling the decisionmaking within the corporate endeavor on behalf of 
principals/owners/shareholders—namely, agents/managers/directors.123 
And, over time,124 corporate law seems to have devised the unique 
controlling mechanism which binds the latter to the former: fiduciary duties 
                                                                                                                           
See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49; Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, 
supra note 41, at 810. 
 119. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49. 
 120. MILTON, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, supra note 116. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., 
Discretion of Corporate Management to Do Good at the Expense of Shareholder Gain—A Survey 
of, and Commentary on, the U.S. Corporate Law, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 7, 8 (1988) (“The bedrock 
principle of U.S. corporate law remains that maximization of shareholder value is the polestar for 
managerial decisionmaking.”); Garrett, supra note 14, at 138 (“The moral imperative for 
corporations is to make money. Under this view of the raison d’être for corporations, choosing 
socially responsible action over profit maximizing action is immoral.”) (footnotes omitted). See 
also Friedman, Social Responsibility, supra note 6. 
 121. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 744 (claiming that law professors have 
come to adopt the shareholder primacy model as “the dominant paradigm for understanding the 
modern corporate enterprise”). 
 122. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4. But see KNIGHT, supra note 4 (“The typical form of 
business unit in the modern world is the corporation. Its most important characteristic is the 
combination of diffused ownership with concentrated control.”). See also BAINBRIDGE, 
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4; COX & HAZEN, supra note 4; Bainbridge, Convergence Debate, 
supra note 2; Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49; Bratton, Century’s Turn, supra note 
4; Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4; Millon, supra note 4; O’Kelley, Theory of the 
Modern Corporation, supra note 4; Pinto, supra note 4. 
 123. For this reason, the shareholder primacy model is also often called the ‘principal-agent 
model’ of the corporation. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49; Gilson & 
Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 603. See also Garrett, supra note 14, at 135–36. 
 124. The dialectic development of fiduciary duties and, thus accountability, of corporate 
managers ‘over time’ was at the core of the so-called ‘Berle-Dodd debate’ between Adolf A. 
Berle, Jr. and E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. in the wake of the Great Depression. See A. A. Berle, Jr., 
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) [hereinafter Berle, 
Corporate Powers] (presenting Berle’s thesis that “all powers granted to a corporation or to the 
management of a corporation . . . are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable 
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of care and loyalty and the obligation of good faith which together 
circumscribe the responsibility of corporate directors to shareholders and 
prevent (under normal circumstances) the kind of delicts125 self-interested 
or inattentive directors as agents can be expected ex ante to commit without 
the existence of such controlling mechanism.126 The fact that fiduciary 
duties are only owed to shareholders must mean that shareholder value must 
be the ultimate measuring stick of corporate control (at least, in a zero-sum 
situation where all other firm inputs are of equal importance/weight).127 The 
classic statement in corporate law that appears to bind corporate directors to 
shareholders as the corporate constituent with the controlling, overriding 
interest is found in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,128 a 1919 Michigan Supreme 
Court case cited by proponents of controlling shareholder interests,129 
                                                                                                                           
benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears”); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate 
Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) [hereinafter Berle, Corporate 
Managers] (providing a response to Dodd’s challenge of Berle’s theory); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., 
For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932) [hereinafter Dodd, 
Corporate Managers Trustees] (challenging Berle’s theory); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is Effective 
Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 
(1935) [hereinafter Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement Practicable?] (providing a response to Berle’s 
response). For an overview of the Berle-Dodd debate, see generally Allen, Schizophrenic 
Conception, supra note 50, at 265–66; Bratton & Wachter, Corporatist Origins, supra note 4, at 
122–34; Fisch, supra note 50, at 646–48; A. A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation 
Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 36–39 (1991); 
Joseph L. Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 64 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1458 (1964). See also Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 22 (stating that “[t]he debate 
between the ‘shareholder primacy’ view and ‘stakeholder’ models of the corporation dates back at 
least seventy years, and [that] it remains unresolved today”) (footnote omitted). In an interesting 
twist to today’s prevailing views on shareholder primacy, Adolf Berle explicitly conceded defeat 
of his shareholder primacy model to Dodd’s stakeholder-oriented model once A.P. Smith 
Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953), appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953), 
was decided. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 
(1954) [hereinafter BERLE, CAPITALIST REVOLUTION]; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra 
note 3, at 561 n.70. 
 125. Fiduciary duties are traditionally seen as delictual obligations, i.e., their breach resonates in 
tort, not in contract. See, e.g., ENEA v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566–67 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2005) (describing fiduciary duties as “delictual” duties “imposed by law” and that “their 
breach sounds in tort”); DeMott, supra note 79, at 887. But see, Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the 
Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 244 (2009) (“All fiduciary relationships are, at 
some level, contractual.”); id. at 270–71 (“Even though all fiduciary relationships are contractual, 
not all contractual relationships are fiduciary.”). 
 126. See O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 762; Rock & Wachter, 
Islands of Conscious Power, supra note 8, at 1661. 
 127. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 603; John H. Matheson & Brent 
A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 
MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1327 (1992). 
 128. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 129. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 220–21; MARJORIE KELLY, 
THE DIVINE RIGHT OF CAPITAL 52–53 (2001); Bainbridge, Convergence Debate, supra note 2, at 
46; Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate 
Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 601 (1992) [hereinafter Mitchell, A Theoretical and 
Practical Framework]; Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at 815. 
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almost without fail,130 as the ultimate legal tenement of shareholder 
primacy:131 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit 
of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for 
that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of 
means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, 
to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among 
stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.132 
Critique. What is centrally problematic about the shareholder primacy 
model, in essence, is that it contradicts—in a multitude of aspects—the 
reality of American corporate law as it is currently ‘on the books.’133 
a. Complete Absence of Explicit Statements of Shareholder 
Primacy 
As a starting point, state corporation statutes refrain from saying 
anything explicit about the purpose of business corporations with regard to 
the creation or maximization of either profits in general or shareholder 
wealth in particular.134 The same is true with the standard constituent 
documents of the corporation (i.e., its certificate, or articles, of 
incorporation, and by-laws).135 Such silence on the very topic of 
shareholder value which falls most squarely within the ambit of the 
shareholder primacy model is perhaps surprising on first blush. However, it 
is conceptually necessary and logical. Simply put, there are (too) many 
ways to go about increasing (or, more precisely, attempting to increase) the 
                                                                                                                           
 130. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 2 (stating that the 
decision is “almost invariably cited” and is “routinely employed as the only legal authority for this 
proposition”); Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at 815. 
 131. It is, of course, interesting and important to note—as Lynn Stout recently has, see Stout, 
Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14—that this statement by the Michigan 
Supreme Court (i) is devoid of any reference or citation of applicable precedent in order to support 
the statement and, thus, the shareholder primacy model decreed therein, id. at 4–5; see also 
Millon, supra note 4, at 223, (ii) is judicial dicta only, Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching 
Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 2, 3–4; see also Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 
41, at 815, and (iii) comes from a marginal jurisdiction as far as American corporate law is 
concerned, Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 3 (stating that 
“Michigan . . . is a distant also-ran in the race between and among the states for influence in 
corporate law”). 
 132. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. See also Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 
1986) (“It is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run 
interests of the corporation’s stockholders.”). 
 133. See Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at 809, 813–14. See also Blair & 
Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 744 (describing the principal-agent model as painting 
“a potentially misleading portrait of the modern business firm”). 
 134. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 678–79. See also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing 
Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 738 (2005) (“Corporate 
managers have never had an enforceable legal duty to maximize corporate profits.”); Rock & 
Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power, supra note 8, at 1643–44. 
 135. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 5. 
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profits for a particular business corporation at any particular point in time in 
any future particularized context,136 and the open-ended texture of the 
statutes and constituent documents simply reflects and documents such ex 
ante indeterminability. At the same time, such open-ended texture also 
provides for the necessary decisional flexibility and maneuverability of firm 
management in order to take adaptive steps on behalf of the corporation 
which will ensure its survival and prosperity and will, thus, ensure 
continued firm sustainability. 
b. Director Fiduciary Duties Run Primarily to the Corporation, 
Not Its Shareholders 
Shareholder primacy models assume that fiduciary duties are indeed 
owed directly—and exclusively—by corporate directors to the 
corporation’s shareholders and that, therefore, corporate directors are, 
indeed, immediately responsible to shareholders who only delegated their 
own authority to conduct their personal business as principals and owners 
of the corporation to corporate directors as their fully accountable agents.137 
As far as we can tell, this is not the law anywhere:138 director fiduciary 
duties are owed primarily to the corporation as a whole (whether perceived 
as a separate entity or a mere aggregation or nexus of firm inputs), not to 
shareholders per se.139 In this regard, it can be said that the shareholder 
primacy model commits a petitio principii fallacy: the model attempts to 
prove shareholder value as the decision-controlling interest by assuming 
and emphasizing shareholder-only-owed duties as evidence of ultimate 
                                                                                                                           
 136. Cf. Gilson, Separation and Function, supra note 6, at 146 (observing that “one cannot run 
a successful business without taking seriously the role of non-shareholders whose contributions 
are important to the corporation’s success”). 
 137. See, e.g., Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 303; Wallman, Purpose of a 
Corporation, supra note 41, at 807. 
 138. Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at 813. 
 139. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) 
(holding that “[i]t is basic to our law that the board of directors . . . owe [sic] fiduciary duties of 
care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.”). See also Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, 
supra note 74, at 290; Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework, supra note 129, at 630–
40; Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 804; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 23; 
Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at 809, 813–14. 
  Though it must be noted that no other firm participant has standing in order to sue 
corporate directors for breaches of fiduciary duties on behalf of the corporation, thus, claiming 
injury to the corporation. This, however, appears to be more a reflection of the institutional 
competence of courts (or their lack thereof as well as their unwillingness) to address threats to the 
corporation in terms of shareholder interests. The courts’ inquiry remains limited to whether 
directors’ actions or inactions were in the best interest of the corporation, not whether 
shareholders would be (hypothetically) better off, or the corporation’s share price would be 
higher, if certain actions had not been taken or certain inactions had been omitted (for example, if 
nightlights had been installed at the baseball stadium, see Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 
(Ill. 1968)). See Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 426–30. The business 
judgment rule limits the courts’ institutional competence (or better, willingness and appetite) for 
such a broad and open-ended second-guessing inquiry even further. Id. 
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shareholder primacy. However, it turns out that shareholder-only-owed 
fiduciary duties do not exist in corporate law.140 
c. As a Rule, Director Decisionmaking Is Absolute 
Even if one were to situate fiduciary duties as running immediately 
between corporate directors on the one hand and the shareholders of the 
corporation, in aggregate, on the other hand, American corporate law 
almost never finds a delictual breach of such fiduciary obligations of 
directors.141 The legal standards for duty-compliant director conduct are 
extremely low (in the absence of blatant director self-interests that remained 
unsanitized at the corporate level),142 while the procedural hurdles that even 
a derivative shareholder claim with merit needs to overcome are extremely 
high (again, in the absence of blatant director self-interests that remained 
unsanitized at the corporate level). These substantive and procedural 
corporate law standards combine to make director liability a genuine 
rarity143—often even a judicial aberration—rather than a robust tool of 
director accountability and, thus, a fair and efficient mechanism of 
corporate control. 
If the board decision is not inflicted by any non-insulated self-interest 
of the acting directors (which board decision corporate law would then 
invalidate for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty),144 virtually 
everything—every motive and every end underlying directorial 
decisionmaking—can become a permissible purpose in order to justify the 
board decision as long as a judicial review within the parameters of the 
business judgment rule presumption145 can independently and sua sponte 
devise a minimum proper rationale for why the board decision appears to be 
made in good faith and in the reasonable belief of having been in the best 
interest of the corporation (and, thus, indirectly also in the best interest of 
protecting firm wealth maximization goals in the short-146 and/or long-
                                                                                                                           
 140. An early conceptualization of this aspect was at the core of the so-called ‘Berle-Dodd 
debate’ between Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. in the wake of the Great Depression 
and their dialectic development of fiduciary duties and, thus accountability, of corporate 
managers. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 142. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2010); N.Y. BUS. CORP. Law § 713 
(McKinney Supp. 2010). 
 143. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. See also Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, 
at 798 (“[T]he duty of care (famously hamstrung by the business judgment rule) is far less 
effective at preventing director shirking.”). 
 144. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 746. 
 145. For an explanation of the business judgment rule, see supra note 87. 
 146. See, e.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 
387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (considering the serious short-term effects that a 
reduction of net income would have had on the market value of the publicly traded American 
Express Company stock). 
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term147).148 In other words, within the confines of the business judgment 
rule, the board’s decisionmaking is absolute.149 There is no “judicial 
backstop”150 (because there is no legal backstop) in order to provide and 
enforce director accountability—neither ex ante nor ex post. 
d. No Shareholder Participation Rights 
In the Berle-Means corporation, shareholders are prevented from any 
meaningful active participation in the management of the corporation. They 
are neither entrepreneurs nor passive owners with ultimate intervention or 
step-in rights who, therefore, in one way or the other would actively 
participate in the management of the business and affairs of the corporation. 
Widely-dispersed shareownership coupled with relatively small (if not, 
minute) holdings of individual shareholders (even in the case of large 
institutional shareholders with multi-million-dollar investments) have 
transformed legions of shareholders into faceless, passive, and non-
dominant investors subject to ‘rational apathy,’151 whose respective 
investments are entirely controlled by professional managers.152 Investment 
entry and investment exit (i.e., what is also known as ‘voting with your 
feet’153—namely purchasing more shares when one likes the business 
performance of the corporation and disposing stock when one is unhappy 
with such performance) are the sole indirect and non-legal participation and 
control avenues available. In particular, even though shareholders 
technically elect the board of directors, shareholders have no factual control 
                                                                                                                           
 147. See generally Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. 1968) (considering the long-term 
interests of the Chicago Cubs franchise corporation in its property value at Wrigley Field which 
might demand all efforts to keep the neighborhood from deteriorating). 
 148. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Brehm v. Eisner, 
746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000); BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 114. 
 149. See, e.g., Helfman v. Am. Light & Traction Co., 187 A. 540, 550 (N.J. Ch. 1936) (“In a 
purely business corporation . . . the authority of the directors in the conduct of the business of the 
corporation must be regarded as absolute when they act within the law, and the court is without 
authority to substitute its judgment for that of the directors.”) (emphasis added). See also supra 
note 89 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, supra note 5, at 1613; id. at 1617 (judicial 
safety net); Mitchell, Importance of Being Trusted, supra note 85, at 614 (legal backstop). 
 151. Bainbridge, Convergence Debate, supra note 2, at 50; Blair & Stout, Director 
Accountability, supra note 58, at 433. 
 152. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49; Millon, supra note 4, at 214–15; 
O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 760–61; Stout, Proper Motives, 
supra note 77, at 3. 
 153. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 434. Sometimes also referred to 
as ‘voting with your wallet,’ see, e.g., Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 802, as doing the 
‘Wall Street walk,’ see, e.g., Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 3, or as adopting the ‘Wall 
Street Rule,’ see, e.g., Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 21. 
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(and, arguably, no legal control) over the boardroom setup, over who makes 
it onto the board of directors, and who does not.154 
There are three main reasons for this often underappreciated 
phenomenon. First, during the board nomination process, current directors 
will self-nominate as a slate or handpick and nominate a new board 
candidate as part of the slate in case a current board member has earlier 
resigned or otherwise will no longer be a board member post-election.155 In 
this regard, corporate boards of Berle-Means corporations are de facto self-
perpetuating.156 
Furthermore, board elections occur pursuant to the proxy system 
prescribed for the publicly listed corporation by federal law. The proxy 
statement published by the corporation and mailed to all of its shareholders 
of record will list the self-nominated slate of board candidates for election 
(i.e., the current directors and any hand-picked successor)—and no one 
else. Any outside (insurgent) board candidate wishing to engage in a proxy 
contest has to prepare her own proxy materials at prohibitive production 
costs and faces even more prohibitive proxy solicitation costs trying to 
reach out to a largely passive shareholder base in an effort to garner support 
for herself as an alternative board candidate.157 With shareholders mostly 
being rationally apathetic and passive investors who are accustomed to the 
absence of any genuine participation rights in the corporation, a proxy 
solicitation contest—in the vast majority of cases and as a matter of 
routine—results in favor of the corporation and its own proxy request for its 
incumbent directors.158 The incumbent directors of the corporation are 
simply able to collect enough proxies from shareholders who will not attend 
the shareholders meeting at which the board election takes place in person 
                                                                                                                           
 154. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. 
LAW. 43, 45–46 (2003); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 675 (2007). 
 155. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 434. 
 156. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 87–88. See also BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra 
note 4, at 72 (“In practice, of course, even the election of directors (absent a proxy contest) is 
predetermined by the existing board nominating the next year’s board.”); id. at 73 (“Although 
shareholders . . . retain the right to elect directors, the incumbent board controls the election 
process, and thus the firm.”); Dent, Jr., supra note 97, at 1219. 
 157. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy 
Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1071, 1085–87 (1990); Kahan, supra note 70, at 
1894; Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 789. 
 158. See Peter Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy 
Contests, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 407–11 (1983) (examining a sample of firms experiencing proxy 
contests for seats on their board of directors and finding that dissident shareholders usually fail to 
obtain a majority of board seats in a given proxy contest); Kahan, supra note 70, 1894; Stout, 
Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 3. 
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(which is, in almost all cases, a vast majority of shareholders) and, thus, as 
proxyholders for such shareholders proceed to re-elect themselves.159 
Lastly, most board elections in publicly listed corporations do still 
follow the so-called plurality voting system. Unlike a majority voting 
system, where ‘yes’ and ‘no’ votes will be cast and counted for each 
individual candidate (who would then require a majority of affirmative 
votes from all votes cast for her to be elected), the plurality system only 
allows shareholders to vote either ‘yes’ or to ‘withhold’ their votes. 
Withheld votes are not counted as ‘votes cast.’ Thus, all votes cast that will 
remain as ‘votes cast’ after this convenient legal ‘technicality’ is applied are 
the ‘yes’ votes.160 As a matter of state corporate law, only ‘votes cast’ 
determine the outcome of the election. ‘Plurality’ in this context then only 
means that those board nominees who accumulate the most ‘yes’ votes for 
themselves out of all ‘votes cast’ will be elected. Since in most board 
elections the board nominees are nominated as a slate and there is no 
competition for open board seats (i.e., there are only as many open board 
seats as there are board nominees), every board nominee is guaranteed a 
seat and will be elected onto the board as long as she has received one 
single ‘yes’ vote out of all ‘votes cast’. And to further ensure that there is at 
least one ‘yes’ vote for each board nominee (actually, that there are a lot of 
‘yes’ votes for each board candidate), proxy cards are usually set up in a 
way that one can only vote ‘yes’ for the entire slate of (self-)nominated 
board candidates and can only ‘withhold’ individual votes from particular 
board candidates (the latter, of course, are not considered ‘votes cast’). 
Thus, as long as one single shareholder is voting ‘yes’ for the entire slate of 
board candidates and there is no outside candidate running (which is almost 
never the case for the reasons discussed above), everyone has received at 
least one ‘yes’ vote and is voted in. 
Obviously, this is a far cry from any kind of a democratic election 
process.161 It does not mesh well with any notion of genuine shareholder 
                                                                                                                           
 159. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 277; Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, supra note 74, 
at 311 (“[S]hareholders in public corporations do not in any realistic sense elect boards. Rather, 
boards elect themselves.”); Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 789. 
 160. Even totalitarian states holding pro forma elections (for example, those that were held 
under communist rule in former Warsaw Pact countries) cannot get away with this—though, I am 
sure, their rulers would love to. 
 161. Cf. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 95 (describing one typical response by 
practitioners and commentators to shareholder voting rights as “the whole institution of 
shareholder voting is a fraud, or a mere ceremony designed to give a veneer of legitimacy to 
managerial power, and that in a more forthright world the institution would simply be dropped”); 
Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 555; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for 
Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 849–50 (2005); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, 
Markets and Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law, 74 UMKC L. REV. 41, 41 (2005) 
(stating that “corporate law is chosen by the very corporate managers who ought to be controlled 
by it, and created by lawyers, legislatures and judges unanswerable to the people whose lives are 
affected by it”). Cf. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (citing 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)) (“If the stockholders are displeased with the 
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primacy and majoritarian shareholder control: Shareholders in Berle-Means 
corporations do not control who the individual directors are—who, post-
election, will go on to control their respective firm investments.162 And they 
have no legal means—in the reality of corporate practice—to even replace 
directors who act consistently in a manner that disagrees with a majority of 
shareholders’ views on how to maximize corporate profits and shareholder 
gains.163 
e. Directors Are Not Agents 
A further critique of the shareholder primacy model is directed at the 
fact that the authority of board directors is not derived from (and, therefore, 
limited by) any delegating act, any transfer of actual authority by the 
shareholders (as principals), to the directors to transact the shareholders’ 
business on behalf of such shareholders (as agents).164 Rather, all 
corporation statutes create and place ultimate authority to run the firm (as 
statutory authority or authority as a matter of law)165 squarely—and 
exclusively—in the hands of the corporation’s board of directors.166 That 
also means that directors are not legal agents—neither of shareholders nor 
of the corporation.167 They are sui generis a decisionmaking body (or 
organ) of the corporation and are not subject to direct control or supervision 
by anyone, including the firm’s shareholders.168 Furthermore, the authority 
of corporate directors to direct and control the affairs of the corporation for 
                                                                                                                           
action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal to 
turn the board out.”). 
 162. Cf. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 434 (“The net result is that, as 
a practical matter, the casting of shareholder votes in most public corporations is a meaningless 
rite.”). The strongest signal that can be sent by shareholders in this regard (other than, of course, 
voting with their feet—often, at a significant loss to their return on their investment) is an 
accumulation of withheld votes as has happened with Disney’s then CEO, Michael Eisner, in 2004 
when Eisner received about 45% withheld votes at the annual shareholder meeting. See Laura M. 
Holson, 2 Disney Directors to Withhold Board Votes at Annual Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 
2005, at C7. 
 163. Obviously, those shareholders can (and do) vote with their feet—which normally would 
result in a prolonged decrease of the corporation’s share price and which could thereby make the 
corporation a takeover target since it seems to be undervalued because of ‘bad’ management, 
which in turn, would force the incumbent directors to better manage in the first place and listen 
more carefully to disgruntled shareholders. However, this is a market mechanism, not a legal 
mechanism of shareholder ‘influence’—it cannot constitute genuine shareholder ‘control’ if one 
has to exit one’s investment first (usually, at a loss in value then) in order to bring changes for 
which there will be no longer any financial return. 
 164. Cf. Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 804. 
 165. Cf. Millon, supra note 4, at 215. 
 166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (West 2010); REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1984). 
See also CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 690; HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 24, at 
505; Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 746. 
 167. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 76; HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 
24, at 506; Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 423; Blair & Stout, Corporate 
Law, supra note 74, at 290; Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 804. 
 168. Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 290. 
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and on behalf of the corporation is also original (as opposed to, delegated 
and, thus, derivative) and sui generis.169 
f. Directors Control Shareholder Return 
One area of complete director discretion which is specifically set forth 
in state corporation statutes is the declaration of dividends.170 There is no 
statutory mandate for declaring dividends and, in today’s world, a board can 
refuse any shareholder request for dividend declarations without fear of 
liability. There is good reason for such absolute board discretion: In its 
absence, opportunistic, predatory and even cannibalistic shareholder wealth 
‘maximization’ would be the norm and would ultimately destroy the 
corporation rather than allow its continued prosperity and survival. For 
example, aggressive speculative shareholders would invest for a powerful 
stake, pressure boards into dividend payments in order to milk as much firm 
value out of the corporation short-term, leave the corporation with 
insufficient financial maneuverability for innovation and adaptation long-
term, and then would either dump the stock before it has no value left or 
forfeit it entirely and move on to their next target. Their investment strategy 
would become a de facto (partial) liquidation strategy. Corporate law 
decidedly estopps such opportunistic shareholder behavior by at least 
curtailing (if not, not recognizing) shareholder primacy and by creating 
absolute director primacy for the declaration of dividends as a matter of 
law,171 thereby discouraging intershareholder opportunism.172 
g. Charitable Giving 
Corporations can make charitable contributions—none of which 
directly benefit shareholders (quite the opposite is true: they directly and 
adversely affect shareholders as far as their bottomline is concerned) and, 
                                                                                                                           
 169. Cf. Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918); Burrill v. Nahant Bank, 43 Mass. 
163, 166–67 (1840); BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 74. 
The model behind corporate law’s treatment of authority is one of a unilaterally 
controlled flow of authority from a single wellspring of power rather than a bubbling up 
and flowing together of many individual sources of personal power. The state has 
power; it chooses to delegate it to the board of directors of a corporation.  
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 22; Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary 
Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 56 (John W. Pratt & 
Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985) [hereinafter Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties] 
(stating that “directors are not agents of the corporation but are sui generis”) (emphasis added); 
Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. 
REV. 173, 216 (1985). 
 170. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 173 (West 2010). 
 171. Cf. Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 796 (describing the opposite example where 
corporate stakeholders would be reluctant to make firm-specific investments in public companies 
“run by widely dispersed but powerful shareholders, some of whom might be tempted to pump up 
share price by making opportunistic threats”). 
 172. Id. at 808. 
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arguably, most of which have not even any indirect (tangible or intangible) 
positive effect on the corporation.173 For some time, it seemed unclear 
whether charitable contributions would, indeed, be permissible (or whether 
they would rather be ultra vires, thus, resulting in director liability for 
allocating corporate assets to non-corporate purposes), but once A.P. Smith 
Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow was decided in 1953,174 their legality has no 
longer been in question.175 
h. Inevitable Shareholding Asymmetries 
The Berle-Means corporation inevitably evidences shareholder 
asymmetries (or schisms) since shareholders—widely dispersed among 
various spectrums (sophistication, financial wherewithal, diversification, 
pooling, appetite for risk, short-, mid- and long-term return expectations, 
tax treatment, etc.) are by no means a homogeneous group.176 Within any 
current group of shareholders at any point in time, individual shareholder 
interests will necessarily vary (and, as evidenced by shareholder majority 
decisions and the absence of unanimous shareholder decisions—for 
example, on corporate mergers—will regularly contradict each other); 
shareholders may favor short-term vs. long-term investment strategies; their 
holding of fractional interests in the corporation may differentiate among 
various classes (and series) of common stock and preferred stock (with 
according differences on shareholder returns that are attributable to the 
relative economic rights of such different varieties of stock); most 
shareholders will have different investment entry points (with, for example, 
some shareholders purchasing stock at $.50 to the dollar after the 
corporation has encountered losses and other shareholders purchasing the 
same stock at $1.50 to the dollar during the same corporation’s heavily 
oversubscribed initial public offering).177 Obviously, proponents of the 
                                                                                                                           
 173. Cf. Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 308 (finding charitable contributions 
controversial because they can be a “form of self-aggrandizing or self-promoting behaviour by 
management”). 
 174. A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 581 (N.J. 1953), appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 
861 (1953). 
 175. Indeed, Adolf Berle, the most vocal opponent at the time of the broad field now known as 
‘corporate social responsibility’ (in which corporate charitable giving is often regarded as a tool 
for corporations to “do the right thing”), conceded defeat of his shareholder primacy model 
because of this decision. BERLE, CAPITALIST REVOLUTION, supra note 124. See also 
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 222–23; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra 
note 3, at 561 n.70. The debate between Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd in the 1930s established 
the roots of ‘corporate social responsibility’ as a normative alternative to shareholder value 
models of the firm. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 176. See Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 307; Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching 
Dodge v. Ford, supra note 14, at 9. 
 177. Cf. Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 21; Bainbridge, Shareholder 
Disempowerment, supra note 75, at 1745; Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at 
808 n.5 (asking which shareholders are enjoying primacy, “[t]oday’s or tomorrow’s (presumably 
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efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH) try to solve this asymmetry by 
declaring that shareholder wealth maximization translates into maximizing 
the current share price of the corporation in order to harmonize, for 
example, present and future shareholder interests.178 However, in my 
judgment, such solution significantly broadens the corporate end (away 
from any shareholderist model, that is) and simply restates the core purpose 
of the business corporation, namely that it should aspire to be as profitable 
as possible at any future point in time based on corporate actions taken or 
not taken today. It is simply the statement of a wealth maximization ideal 
with no impact on necessarily disparate actual shareholder interests (and the 
resultant potential for intershareholder opportunism) tomorrow or at any 
point thereafter, or the significance of such disparate actual interests on the 
actions taken or not taken by corporate directors today. 
i. Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes 
To date, over thirty states have adopted so-called nonshareholder 
constituency statutes as part of their respective state corporate statutes, 
thereby amending the existing statutory fiduciary duty framework for 
corporate directors.179 Under such constituency statutes, directors are 
permitted (in Connecticut, even required) to consider both the short- and 
long-term effects of their decisions on not only the shareholders of the 
corporation but also on a varying list of other constituents of the firm, such 
as employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, and the local communities in 
which the corporation operates.180 Arguably, more than half of the state 
corporation statutes have thus adopted a managerialist (rather than 
shareholder-centric) view of the corporation where senior management is 
given broad discretion to give due and fair consideration to all factors of 
production (stakeholder interests) that constitute the firm.181 Recognizing 
the respective interests of such nonshareholder firm participants—or 
stakeholders—is not surprising182 but rather emphasizes that shareholder 
                                                                                                                           
not yesterday’s)?,” “[a]bitrageurs or long-term shareholders?,” or “[t]ax-exempt institutions or 
taxable individuals?”). 
 178. Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 306; Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, 
supra note 41, at 808. 
 179. See, e.g., Anthony Bisconti, Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes 
Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 768 
n.13 (2009) (counting 32 states with corporate constituency statutes). See also Hart, An 
Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 305 n.17; Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, 
at 810. 
 180. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 223–25; Wallman, Purpose of a 
Corporation, supra note 41, at 810. 
 181. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1403. 
 182. What is a bit surprising (or, at least, counter-intuitive on first blush) are the circumstances 
of how constituency statutes came about as legislative amendments to state corporate statutes, 
designed to insulate board directors from personal liability in corporate takeover battles. “In many 
cases, the force behind these [amendments seem to have] been incumbent management” in efforts 
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interests are never at the center (or, depending on semantics, are always at 
the center) of a sound business decision of a given board of directors. My 
final point of critique addresses this semantic conundrum.183 
j. Inevitable Firm Investment Asymmetries 
By economic necessity, the interests of a Berle-Means corporation—as 
a whole and as a going concern—cannot be congruent with and identical to 
the interests of its shareholders (or, as a semantic alternative, the interests of 
the corporation can only be completely congruent and identical—at all 
times—with the interests of its shareholders). The corporation provides a 
mechanism for shareholders to gain returns on their investment. But that is 
the case with any other firm participant. In this regard, the wealth-
maximization or profit-seeking motive of the corporation is a means to an 
end, not an end in itself.184 And the end is not shareholder wealth 
maximization, it is wealth maximization for all firm participants who 
otherwise would not be willing to invest in the first place if their respective 
interests to gain returns on firm-specific investments would have to yield to 
specific shareholder interests routinely and as a matter of law (assuming, for 
a moment, that shareholder interests could indeed be expressed una voce). 
There is also (obviously) an even larger end in benefiting society as a 
whole185 by conducting entrepreneurial activity within the corporate form 
rather than relying solely on market competition and contractual 
arrangements. Indeed, market forces push for such entrepreneurial activity 
to be organized within a firm—a hierarchical structure sheltered, as far as 
its inner organization is concerned, from market forces to a certain extent 
which gives it a competitive advantage over non-firm structures of 
entrepreneurial organization. Ronald Coase’s famous 1937 inquiry into the 
                                                                                                                           
to fight off hostile takeovers. Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 305 n.17. Accordingly, 
they must be regarded as entrenchment tools for corporate boards, helping such boards to insulate 
themselves even more from a (predatory) market for corporate control than the reach of the 
business judgment rule may have insulated them before, and clearly—as night and day or black 
and white—declaring shareholders (and their interests and purported primacy) as merely inter 
pares. See Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 305 n.17; Roberta Romano, The Political 
Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 122–37 (1987) (focusing on the developments 
in Connecticut). 
 183. This semantic conundrum relates to my earlier description of the shareholder primacy 
model above: Firm value is, ipso facto, shareholder value (and vice versa). While this may be a 
correct statement in complete abstract terms (i.e., a mere theoretical application of the profit-
seeking motive of the for-profit business corporation), I believe it makes a distinct difference in 
corporate reality when you tell management: “create shareholder value!” instead of “create firm 
value!” (or—not and!—vice versa). The almost constant lamentations of corporate managers over 
the pressures created by mandatory quarterly financial reports and the expectations of stock 
analysts that inevitably go with it—all of which often relegate long-term strategic management of 
the corporation to an afterthought—appear to be good evidence of such difference in profit-
seeking commands. 
 184. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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nature of the firm provides exactly this explanation.186 As far as 
microtheoretical models of the firm reach, we can say that all firm inputs—
all firm-specific investments and, thus, all firm participants—matter for 
purposes of productive gains.187 And it is clear from the plain and 
straightforward rules of American corporate law ‘on the books’ that 
directors are permitted (if not, required) to routinely and diligently consider 
the interests of all factors of production (i.e. all firm participants) and, 
therefore, of corporate constituencies other than shareholders,188 in order to 
decide on behalf of all firm participant interests (i.e., the interest of the 
corporation as a whole—whether regarded as a separate entity or a mere 
aggregation of firm inputs) what is in the best interest of the whole 
construct organized and sheltered from the market in the form of the 
incorporated firm. 
k. Conclusion 
Shareholder wealth maximization is not an answer, an end in itself, but 
just a repetition of the second, substantive question of corporate governance 
(“Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”) cleverly disguised as an answer. Because 
of the residual claimant position of shareholders189 and the for-profit motive 
of the business corporation,190 it is perhaps reflexively appropriate to 
subject the best-interest decisionmaking of corporate directors under an 
‘umbrella label’ of shareholder wealth maximization. But this is only 
semantics—a mere labeling exercise (probably a convenient, somewhat 
self-hypnotic labeling exercise) in order to not have to ask the fundamental 
question of how maximization is to be done in any particularized context; 
how the diverse, short-, mid- and long-term interests of a highly dispersed 
and asymmetrical shareholder base that expects at least some return on its 
investment translate into actions taken by a board of directors that not only 
pays nominal, ceremonial homage to such a mixed bag of interests but, in 
                                                                                                                           
 186. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. See also Coase, supra note 8, at 393 (“Outside 
the firm, price movements direct production, which is co-ordinated through a series of exchange 
transactions on the market. Within a firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in place of 
the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-co-
ordinator, who directs production.”). 
 187. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 188. See, e.g., Wallman, Purpose of a Corporation, supra note 41, at 810. 
 189. See CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 18–19. 
  [A]lthough the corporation has numerous and perhaps all-encompassing duties to 
these [stakeholders other than shareholders], it is the shareholders who have the claim 
on the residual value of the enterprise, that is, what’s left after all definite obligations 
are satisfied, and the managers have an affirmative open-ended obligation to increase 
this residual value, rather than the wealth of some other affected group (including 
themselves). 
Id.; Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 303. 
 190. Cf. COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, at 3. 
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fact, actuates them properly in the board decisionmaking process; and, most 
fundamentally and crucially, how director behavior can be properly 
incentivized in order to do exactly that—to pay not only nominal, 
ceremonial homage but, indeed, to act in the best interest of the corporation 
over and over and over again. The argument that is usually proffered 
against stakeholderist models of the corporation by shareholder 
primacists—namely that “a broad definition of [director] fiduciary duty is 
essentially vacuous, because it allows management to justify almost any 
action on the grounds that it benefits some [stakeholder] group”191—can 
and must be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the shareholder wealth 
maximization model itself: It is essentially vacuous because the substantive 
and procedural interplays of the fiduciary duty of care and the business 
judgment rule allow management to justify virtually any action on the 
grounds that it benefits shareholders as a group.192 
To put it more bluntly: It can be said that shareholder primacy is a not a 
(legal) mandate but more of a shorthand cloak designed to (perhaps 
conveniently) cover what is really going on. In a model of corporate 
governance, it is a simple trick that is rephrasing the question as an answer 
but is logically no answer at all but a ruse. The shareholder primacy 
model—through its critical reliance on the shareholder wealth maximization 
norm as the controlling and critical variable—pretends to explain the real 
world phenomenon of investor confidence ex ante.193 Given, however, that 
shareholder wealth maximization has no discernable meaning ex ante (and 
also does not provide for any discernable director accountability ex post 
under current American corporate law rules), its predictive ability—if we 
are indeed to rely, at least, on the rhetoric of shareholder value194—must 
come from somewhere else and combine with this rhetoric in order to make 
the model functional. In my judgment, how the model’s functionality is 
achieved (and through what kind of an instrumentarium), how the model 
operates precisely step-by-step, how shareholder value is tied effectively to 
board decisionmaking and genuinely controls the latter—all of these 
questions, to date, are left entirely open and unexplained. 
2. The Contractarian Model 
Who Controls: ‘Nexus’ of explicit and implicit contracts (no 
individual group of firm participants controls the firm). 
Whose Interest(s) Control(s): Shareholders (indirectly, all firm 
participants exert some influence since shareholders are residual claimants). 
                                                                                                                           
 191. Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 303 (emphasis added). 
 192. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 194. Cf. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 407. 
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Main Locus: Quadrant II; with, perhaps, a bit of Quadrant IV 
(shareholder interests control; other firm participants interests are 
recognized in the majoritarian bargaining defaults which constitute 
corporate law; board of directors/management is fully accountable). 
Description. In 1976, the destruction of the formalistic corporate-law 
construct of the firm began in earnest195 when Michael Jensen and William 
Meckling published their now seminal article on the theory of the firm, 
describing therein the corporation as an intricate ‘nexus’ (or network)196 of 
interdependent interactions and complex (mostly implicit) ‘contracting’197 
relationships among various participants investing resources within the 
business of the firm.198 The contractarian (or nexus-of-contracts) model of 
the corporate firm was conceived. At its heart, it accepts that firm 
participants whose interests intersect within the corporate nexus are all 
endowed with relative bargaining positions and relative investment/wealth 
values. They then simply engage in a combination of explicit and implicit 
contractual and quasi-contractual arrangements in order to create the 
construct (or nexus) of the firm.199 As a result, the corporation is merely a 
consensual ordering of relations among firm participants which, 
accordingly, is to be governed by such voluntary private-party ordering and 
no mandatory governmental regulation.200 All that corporate law then does 
is to provide a dispositive (or permissive)201 structure—as a majoritarian 
                                                                                                                           
 195. Cf. Klausner, supra note 46, at 781 (describing the impact of the contractarian theory of 
the firm as “providing a conceptual starting point—a clearing of the analytic underbrush—for 
further work”). 
 196. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1401. 
 197. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 198. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 17, at 305. Of similar importance was Eugene Fama’s 
1980 article on the same topic, Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 
J. POLITICAL ECON. 288 (1980) [hereinafter Fama, Agency Problems]. Jensen and Meckling’s 
article was based on earlier work published by Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, 
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972), and Fama and 
Jensen later collaborated in another important contribution, Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, 
The Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983). See also BAINBRIDGE, 
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 49, at 27–33; Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 819; 
Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 599; Millon, supra note 4, at 229; 
O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 763. 
 199. See, e.g., Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1182 (7th Cir. 
1990) (“A corporation is not a living person but a set of contracts the terms of which determine 
who will bear the brunt of liability.”); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 17 (1991) (“All the terms in corporate governance 
are contractual in the sense that they are fully priced in transactions among the interested 
parties.”); Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5; Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, 
The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 767, 770 (1989); Hart, An 
Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 306. 
 200. See, e.g., COX & HAZEN, supra note 4, at 42; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 
3, at 551; Garrett, supra note 14, at 137; O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 
4, at 755. See also supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 201. Cf. HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 24, at 331 (explaining how corporate law, in large 
part, is a set of permissive default rules subject to alteration by firm participants). 
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default202—through which the relative investment/wealth values of firm 
participants, held together by the contractarian nexus of the firm, are 
constantly created, divided, re-created, adjusted, and sometimes (perhaps, 
oftentimes) also destroyed203—though the latter would likely have to be 
seen as a failure of proper ‘contracting’ or as the materialization of the 
transactional and stochastic risks created by necessarily ‘incomplete’ long-
term relational204 contracts.205 
Thus viewed, corporate law is simply our response to a pragmatic 
problem of creating and dividing economic rents while reducing transaction 
costs to a minimum.206 And, like a general partnership (at least, pursuant to 
the position taken under the original Uniform Partnership Act of 1916), the 
corporation is nothing more than a mere aggregation of individual firm 
participants who own the factors of production within the organizational 
                                                                                                                           
 202. The majoritarian default describes the neoclassical view that corporate statutes, as 
legislative and dispositive-only default provisions, merely provide those standard provisions 
necessary for ordering the corporate nexus which a majority of firm participants would have 
chosen and contracted for anyhow if contracting with all other firm participants could occur with 
limited to no transaction costs and maximum completeness. Therefore, corporate law constitutes 
nothing else but the sum total of all standardized terms of implicit contracts which economists 
posit would be entered into over and over again by rational investors under similar circumstances 
if actual negotiation and drafting of those terms were indeed possible. See, e.g., COX & HAZEN, 
supra note 4, at 42; HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 24, at 330–31. 
 203. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 600 (discussing how particular 
changes since the mid-1980s in the overall financial and commercial environment in which 
corporations operate have “altered the relative value and bargaining endowments of those whose 
interests intersected through the metaphorical corporate nexus,” and concluding that corporate law 
“provides the structure through which both the creation and division of value takes place”). 
 204. Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978). 
 205. In a firm nexus that is characterized by operational uncertainty and complexity as well as 
by bounded rationality of its participants, it is inevitable that the long-term ‘contractual’ 
arrangements made by such participants are necessarily incomplete (i.e., they do not address, and 
provide ex ante solutions for, all possible contingencies). Cf. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, 
supra note 4, at 226; Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1400, 1405; Hart, Norms 
and Theory, supra note 96. In other words, uncertainty exists because of the “lack of knowledge 
of what the future will bring, [i.e., because of the lack of knowledge] of all stochastic variables.” 
Richter, supra note 45, at 175 n.22. See, e.g., Alces, supra note 125, at 241–42; Bainbridge, The 
Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 556 n.44; Meurer, supra note 9, at 739. See also Dooley, supra 
note 11, at 465 (“If there were no bounded rationality, including no limitations on human foresight 
or the ability to acquire and process information, individuals could write completely specified 
contingent contracts.”); Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, in TRUST: MAKING AND 
BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 213, 218 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) (“If we were blessed 
with an unlimited computational ability to map out all possible contingencies in enforceable 
contracts, trust would not be a problem.”) (reference omitted). 
 206. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 199, at 5 (stating that the corporate contract will 
provide for governance structures that are “most beneficial to investors, net of the costs of 
maintaining the structure”); Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5; Fama, Agency 
Problems, supra note 198, at 289–90. See also Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 
3, at 600; Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 823 (stating that the nexus-of-contract theory of the firm 
conceives the corporation simply as “the product of market forces”). 
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structure of the firm207 and proceed to explicitly and implicitly contract with 
each other for their cooperative use by the firm (i.e., everyone)—a natural 
product of private-party initiative and market competition without much, if 
any, of a separate (entity) existence in the law.208 Accordingly, if the 
corporate governance structure provided by the default provisions209 of 
corporate statutes does not satisfy the circumstances of a particular firm, the 
firm participants (in particular, shareholders) can contract out of them and 
can create an individualized, customized corporate charter that reflects the 
particular nexus of such firm—at least, as long as transaction costs of 
contracting are assumed to be zero or negligible.210 
Critique. The contractarian model has always run into problems when 
confronted with the real world.211 It is premised on the simplifying (but 
surreal) assumption of the “Coasean World”212 of an ideal market 
comprised of perfectly rational and omniscient economic decisionmakers: 
everyone in the market knows everything there is to know about prices, 
demand, product quality, firm organization, etc., and has the ability to 
infinitely contract according to changing needs.213 In reality, the 
                                                                                                                           
 207. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (“A corporation is, after all, but an association 
of individuals under an assumed name . . . .”); Fama, Agency Problems, supra note 198, at 289–
90. 
 208. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 199, at 12; Allen, Contracts and 
Communities, supra note 5; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 548; Millon, supra 
note 4, at 201–02, 211, 213. See also Klausner, supra note 46, at 779 (“At its broadest theoretical 
level, this transformation reconceived the corporation as a contractual entity and reconceived 
corporate law as a largely passive adjunct to the contracting process that creates a corporation.”). 
Indeed, it can be argued that the nexus-of-contracts conception of the corporation is not a theory 
of the firm at all, it is a theory of why there is no firm (since the Coasean solution to the boundary-
of-the-firm problem has been evaporated and all direction of firm affairs now only occurs under 
contracting/negotiation/market paradigms). See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 832; Millon, supra 
note 4, at 229. 
 209. Klausner, supra note 46, at 780; Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, supra note 5, 
at 1617. 
 210. Klausner, supra note 46, at 780, 796. But see Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra 
note 3, at 607. 
 211. See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 46, at 779 (concluding that “while the contractarian theory 
was a useful starting point for economic analysis of corporate law, more recent research 
demonstrates that as a description of reality, or a basis for policy prescription, the theory falls 
short”). See also In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
Delaware law should not be based on a reductionist view of human nature that 
simplifies human motivations on the lines of the least sophisticated notions of the law 
and economics movement. Homo sapiens is not merely homo economicus. We may be 
thankful that an array of other motivations exist that influence human behavior; not all 
are any better than greed or avarice, think of envy, to name just one. But also think of 
motives like love, friendship, and collegiality, think of those among us who direct their 
behavior as best they can on a guiding creed or set of moral values. 
Id. 
 212. Klausner, supra note 46, at 796. 
 213. See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 24, at 331; KNIGHT, supra note 4, at 197 (“Chief 
among the simplifications of reality prerequisite to the achievement of perfect competition is . . . 
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fundamental corporate governance structures and mechanisms commonly 
adopted by Berle-Means corporations in the United States (i.e., 
                                                                                                                           
the assumption of practical omniscience on the part of every member of the competitive system.”); 
Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1396, 1405. 
  The only management task that seems to remain, and which is the focus of attention 
in the firm of traditional price theory, is the selection of profit-maximizing quantities of 
outputs and inputs. But, since the required information for doing this is also freely in 
hand, and the required calculations are costless to make, the model strips management 
of any meaningful productivity in the performance of even these tasks. The cost of 
maximizing is ignored or implicitly assumed to be zero. De facto, the resources that 
might be required to make maximizing decisions are treated as if they are not scarce. 
Demsetz, supra note 44, at 143 (footnote omitted). But see Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, 
supra note 3, at 607; Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 300 (“The neoclassical theory of 
the firm, although useful, portrays the modern business enterprise in caricature terms.”); Mitchell, 
Importance of Being Trusted, supra note 85; O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra 
note 4, at 757; Ripken, supra note 63, at 165; Sheehy, supra note 15, at 22. 
  See also ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 53–55 (1990) (summarizing the assumptions underlying neoclassical 
economic theory, including (i) that economic actors always behave rationally and in a self-
interested manner, and (ii) that economic actors have complete and perfect information available 
in their pursuit of economic opportunities); Douglass C. North, Structure and Performance: The 
Task of Economic History, 16 J. ECON. LIT. 963, 964 (1978) (summarizing the same assumptions 
as “(1) perfectly competitive markets, (2) perfectly specified and costlessly enforced property 
rights, (3) neutral government, and (4) unchanging tastes”). The artifice of those test conditions 
(as well as their cumulative effect) has, of course, been famously parodied by economist and 
Nobel laureate George Stigler in his Conference Handbook. George J. Stigler, The Conference 
Handbook, 85 J. POL. ECON. 441 (1977). According to his Handbook, all we need to say here for 
support of the point made above is “9-13-14-16-23-24-30” which numerical labels stand for, 
respectively:  
9. The conclusions change if you introduce uncertainty. 
. . . 
13.The market cannot, of course, deal satisfactorily with that externality. 
14. But what if transaction costs are not zero? 
. . . 
16. Of course, if you allow for the investment in human capital, the entire picture 
changes. 
. . . 
23. The motivation of the agents in this theory is so narrowly egotistic that it cannot 
possibly explain the behavior of real people. 
24. The flabby economic actor in this impressionistic model should be replaced by the 
utility-maximizing individual. 
. . .  
30. The paper is rigidly confined by the paradigm of neoclassical economics, so large 
parts of urgent reality are outside its comprehension. 
Id. at 442–43. 
2011] Deconstructing Corporate Governance 385 
predominantly, the Delaware General Corporation Law)214 are static and 
uniform: firm participants make no contractual commitments to change or 
maintain such statutory default structures and mechanisms during either the 
formation phase, the public offering phase, or the remaining lifespan phase 
of the corporation215 and, but for protecting incumbent management from 
hostile takeovers, charter documents show very little diversity and 
deliberate contracting away from default rules.216 As Michael Klausner 
succinctly put it after a review of over 600 charters of corporations involved 
in either an initial public offering or a spinoff: “Corporate charters come in 
one flavor: plain vanilla.”217 
In addition, leading contractarian scholars also adopt the traditional 
shareholder primacy argument that shareholders, as the firm’s residual 
claimants are, thus, assumed to act as ultimate principals in a set of explicit 
and implicit agency contracts that hire the firm’s productive resources, 
thereby establishing the nexus that makes up the firm.218 Shareholders 
therefore retain a special position within the nexus—primus inter pares 
among the corporation’s other constituencies—and enjoy a ‘contract’ with 
the firm (nexus) that grants them ownership-like rights, including as 
beneficiaries of fiduciary obligations owed to them by directors.219 In other 
words, shareholder primacy is simply a majoritarian ‘contractual’ default 
rule.220 
As such, the contractarian model has positive (i.e., descriptive and 
empirical) value221—in particular, for pointing out that the central, critical 
participant within the firm nexus is its manager who puzzles together (and 
                                                                                                                           
 214. See, e.g., Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1559, 1592 (2002) (finding from his analysis of an empirical sample of over 6,000 firms that went 
public between 1978–2000, that over seventy percent of those firms incorporated in Delaware 
during the second half of this period). See also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ 
Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383 (2003); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law 
Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 527 (2001); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: 
Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 226 (1985); Guhan 
Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004); Guhan 
Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choices: Evidence on the 
“Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795 (2002). 
 215. See Klausner, supra note 46, at 781–82. 
 216. See Klausner, supra note 46, at 790. There are empirical studies that support this finding. 
John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1301 (2001). See generally Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize 
Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (2001); Laura Casares 
Field & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms, 57 J. FIN. 1857 (2002). 
 217. Klausner, supra note 46, at 790 (footnote omitted). 
 218. See, e.g., Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5; Blair & Stout, Team 
Production, supra note 49; O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 755. 
 219. Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 548; Blair & Stout, Director 
Accountability, supra note 58, at 410. 
 220. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 833. See also Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra 
note 58, at 416–17 (discussing the preference for shareholder primacy in contractarian corporate 
theory). 
 221. Cf. Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 300; Klausner, supra note 46, at 779, 796. 
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constantly, re-puzzles and re-juggles) all ‘contractual’ inputs for purposes 
of corporate adaptation and success.222 However—notwithstanding the 
normative prescriptive force of its neoclassical-economics-derived, 
minimalist account of what corporate law should be223—not much modeling 
and conceptualizing help can be expected when one ventures into the 
second (substantive) question of corporate governance, “Whose Interest(s) 
Control(s)?”.224 Indeed, the reversion to shareholder wealth maximization 
as the central decision-guiding norm of corporate decisionmakers short-
circuits and avoids answering such a normative question (as has been 
pointed out before225).226 A realistic (rather than idealistic) view of the 
corporation must recognize that firms are much more than the result of 
‘contracts,’ (i.e., actual bargains, explicit or implicit) which result in their 
respective organizational structures and internal order and provides the 
necessary inner cohesion for what are often hundreds of thousands of 
individual factors of production in a single Berle-Means corporation.227 
Unless, of course, we rubricate (wholesale, that is) all those critical 
variables which are necessary and currently unexplained for in 
microtheoretical models (for example, ‘trust,’ ‘loyalty,’ and similar socio-
contextual,228 behavior-oriented and reciprocal229 variables230 based on pre-
coded ‘expectations,’ ‘counter-expectations,’ and ‘expectation-
expectations’ and aimed at reducing social complexity231) as implicit actual 
                                                                                                                           
 222. See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 24, at 332. 
 223. Cf. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1405; Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 
824, 836; Klausner, supra note 46. 
 224. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 836 (“[T]he nexus-of-contracts conception, as a positive 
description, has no normative implications.”). 
 225. See supra text accompanying notes 189–194. 
 226. Cf. O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 766. 
 227. Cf. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1402; Stout, Mythical Benefits, 
supra note 92, at 797–98. Included in such ‘much more’ would be, at a minimum, any non-legally 
enforced reciprocal arrangements in the form of social norms (i.e., protolegal variables as, for 
example, trust), the distribution of property rights within the firm and, thus, among the means of 
production, the bureaucratic rules of the internal governance organization of the firm, and the 
hierarchical, command-and-control structure of the firm’s organization in the form of unilateral 
directions by superiors to subordinates made by fiat rather than through negotiation. See, e.g., 
Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 836. 
 228. See Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 13. In addition, it is clear that at least some 
part of what we consider ‘corporate law’ consists of mandatory rules that are not subject to 
enforceable contractual deviations. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 823–24. 
 229. Cf. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 
14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 159, 159 (2000) (“Reciprocity means that in response to friendly 
actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than predicted by the self-
interest model; conversely, in response to hostile actions they are frequently much more nasty and 
even brutal.”). See also Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 822 (stating that, pursuant to the nexus-of-
contract conception of the firm, “the corporation is a nexus of reciprocal arrangements”). 
 230. See supra note 97 at accompanying text. 
 231. Cf. NIKLAS LUHMANN, LOVE AS PASSION: THE CODIFICATION OF INTIMACY (Jeremy 
Gaines & Doris L. Jones trans., 1986). 
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bargains, ergo ‘contracts.’232 In case of such a presupposition exercise, 
however, the nexus-of-contracts model of the firm still owes us a good 
explanation as to what those ‘contracts’ exactly are and how they come into 
being and become part of the nexus.233 
3. The Team Production Model 
Who Controls: Board (as a mediating hierarch by delegation of, and 
with accountability to, all firm participants). 
Whose Interest(s) Control(s): All firm participants (directly as a 
team). 
Main Locus: Quadrants II & IV (all stakeholders interests control, 
not only shareholder interests; board of directors/management remains 
accountable as a mediator who needs to give all firm interests involved their 
relative weight and distributional merit). 
Description. In 1999, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout introduced a new 
way of thinking about corporate governance,234 formulating their ‘team 
production’ theory of the firm.235 It is designed as a logical (and 
complementary) progression from the nexus-of-contracts model of the firm 
                                                                                                                           
You cannot live without forming expectations with respect to contingent events and you 
have to neglect, more or less, the possibility of disappointment. You neglect this 
because it is a very rare possibility, but also because you do not know what else to do. 
The alternative is to live in a state of permanent uncertainty and to withdraw 
expectations without having anything with which to replace them. 
Niklas Luhmann, Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives, in TRUST: MAKING 
AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 94, 97 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988). See also Blair & 
Stout, Trust, supra note 70, at 1796; Geoffrey P. Miller, Norms and Interests, 32 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 637 (2003); Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., supra note 49, at 191; Lynn A. Stout, The 
Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 410–15 (2002) [hereinafter Stout, Investor 
Confidence]. 
 232. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 823 (preferring the term “nexus of reciprocal arrangements” 
over “nexus of contracts”). 
 233. Cf. Klausner, supra note 46, at 781–82 (pointing out that “non-legal economic or 
reputational sanctions” outside of the legally enforceable “corporate contract” as defined in 
contractarian theory are necessary in order to explain the governance structures and mechanisms 
of the firm); id. at 797 (“By failing to account for transaction costs, the contractarian theory fails 
to explain the reality of either the content of firms’ corporate governance commitments or the 
process by which those commitments are formed.”). In addition, the nexus-of-contracts model of 
the firm still owes us a good explanation as to why those ‘contracts’ should be legally enforceable 
on a wholesale basis, in particular, given the fact that the large, publicly-held incorporate firm 
creates a wide range of adverse third-party effects (i.e., negative externalities). See, e.g., 
Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 824; René Reich-Graefe, Deconstructing Corporate Governance: 
Director Primacy Without Principle?, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 465 (forthcoming 2011) 
(discussing negative externalities, i.e., social costs, generated by the corporate endeavor). 
 234. See Mitchell, Trust and Team Production, supra note 12, at 870. 
 235. Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, supra note 74. See also supra note 74 and accompanying 
text. It should be noted that Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, as economists, first described 
the firm organization requiring multiple productive inputs and producing nonseparable outputs 
that are not easily attributable to their respective productive inputs as a “team production.” See 
Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 198, at 779–81. 
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in that it views corporate law as a mechanism for filling in gaps in 
situations where team participants in the firm have found explicit 
contracting too difficult or even impossible given the very real transaction 
costs of such explicit contracting.236 At its core, the team production model 
is premised on three factual features which are all prevalent in the corporate 
firm. First, the economic production (i.e., the creation of firm value) 
requires a team of firm participants (i.e., two parties or more).237 Second, 
every firm-participant team member makes an illiquid, firm-specific or 
‘team-specific’ investment into the corporate venture.238 The idea of a 
‘team-specific’ investment is that the productive factor invested will have a 
significantly higher value and likelihood for return when used within the 
team framework than when compared with its second-best use.239 And 
lastly, firm ‘rents’—i.e., the economic output-gains of the firm as a result of 
team production—are often joint and, thus, nonseparable along the same 
lines that firm inputs (i.e., the team-specific investments) were separable 
from each other prior to their injection into the firm. In other words, it 
proves difficult to attribute any particular portion of the gains to any 
particular team member’s contribution.240 A further structural problem is 
created by the fact that firm-specific investments are often sunk—i.e., 
neither the original investment nor any return the investment may have 
generated or may generate in the future can be easily and unilaterally 
extracted from the firm by the investing firm participant.241 
Firm-specific investments are obviously essential for the creation of 
value by the firm. They will only be made if the correlation between the 
investment and the probability of its return (i.e., its divisional share of the 
                                                                                                                           
 236. Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 254. 
 237. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 419; Blair & Stout, Corporate 
Law, supra note 74, at 249; Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 745. See also 
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investment that can then be somehow shared by the team members. See Blair & Stout, Director 
Accountability, supra note 58, at 420. 
 238. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 419; Stout, Mythical Benefits, 
supra note 92. 
 239. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 745. 
 240. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 419; Blair & Stout, Team 
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 241. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 420 (stating that the resources 
which team members have invested  in the firm “often cannot be recouped once team production 
has begun” and that “team members cannot protect their interest by threatening to withdraw these 
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supra note 49, at 745 (explaining that “investors cannot easily recover the full value of their 
money after it has been spent on specialized equipment and salaries” and that those investors 
“must wait until team production begins before they see a return on their investment”). 
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value created, even if nonseparable) over time is sufficiently predictable 
and satisfactory ex ante. Therefore, it seems appropriate and necessary for 
team production members (i.e., the firm participants making team-specific 
investments) to delegate exclusive authority in order to organize firm 
inputs, distribute firm outputs, and resolve interest conflicts among team 
production members to the board of directors as a mediating hierarch,242 
(i.e., a kind of referee).243 The board is accordingly charged with a complex 
balancing act aimed at serving all stakeholder interests in the firm 
(including those of shareholders).244 It is charged by each and every team 
member to: (i) mediate among the competing interests and demands of all 
the stakeholders and their respective investments involved; and (ii) “protect 
[all stakeholders’] return on their [respective] investments from post-
investment opportunistic behavior” and illicit return-seeking (or return-
protecting) by other stakeholders.245 Given the nexus of firm-specific assets 
invested by team participants, the board serves as a ‘trustee’246 (or 
‘fiduciary’247 or ‘trusted mediator’248) for the entire firm as a productive 
whole but remains insulated from any direct command and control of any 
group or class of team participants.249 What is enough is that, structurally, 
board governance offers firm participants the promise of “business 
continuity”250 (and, thus, of a continued stream of returns on investment for 
everyone). 
Critique. The board as a mediating hierarch is an economic agent for all 
firm participants. Unlike the shareholder primacy model, the team 
                                                                                                                           
 242. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 408, 421; Blair & Stout, 
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 243. Cf. Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 593; O’Kelley, Theory of the 
Modern Corporation, supra note 4, at 756. 
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 247. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 425; Blair & Stout, Corporate 
Law, supra note 74, at 291. 
 248. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58. 
 249. Id. at 408, 421; Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 746. 
 250. Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 110 (1979). 
See also Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 797. 
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production model correctly assumes that the board must be equipped with 
unlimited allocational and distributional powers in order to mediate 
conflicts among the various corporate constituencies.251 The board must be 
able to attract and allocate team-specific investments as well as distribute 
correlative benefits as it sees fit. And it is an often underestimated fact that 
every single board decision does both—allocates resources and distributes 
(future) benefits—simultaneously and often with allocative and distributive 
effects to multiple if not (at least, indirectly) all firm participants.252 The 
result is that no agent-participant group can have an overriding interest that 
would bind the board to act in any particular way. Indeed, the board can act 
(i.e., mediate) in any way it wishes since the collective interests of all firm 
participants are, at best, inextricably diffuse.253 Correspondingly, Blair and 
Stout argue that directors are not subject to direct control or supervision by 
anyone, including the firm’s shareholders.254 
Notwithstanding this unlimited, near-absolute power to mediate,255 the 
team production model insists that the board of directors remains somehow 
accountable to the productive team and all of its participants, namely as a 
‘trustee’ and ‘fiduciary’ to whom team members have ceded control.256 But 
the model only assumes, and does not explain, how such accountability 
                                                                                                                           
 251. In fairness, it should be noted that the Blair/Stout Team Production Model is not only a 
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 254. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 408, 421; Blair & Stout, Team 
Production, supra note 49, at 746; Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 254, 290. 
 255. Blair & Stout, Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 251 (stating that at the peak of the 
corporate hierarchy “sits a board of directors whose authority over the use of corporate assets is 
virtually absolute”). 
 256. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. See also Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, 
supra note 58 (trusted mediator). 
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would be rooted in either the theory or the practice of corporate law.257 
Indeed, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout themselves admit that “team 
members who feel they deserve a larger share of the gains from team 
production must ultimately either appeal to the directors or abandon their 
team-specific investment by exiting the firm.”258 As discussed above, those 
post-investment correctives—which depend either on directors being 
willing to listen to (and to even act upon) ‘appeals’ or on the possibility to 
‘abandon’ an investment that could easily be sunk and, thus, simply ‘non-
abandonable’ or only ‘abandonable’ at significant costs that not only could 
wipe out any return on the investment but a significant portion or, in some 
circumstances, all of the investment itself259—do not seem to help in any 
way with firm investments to be made confidently ex ante and with 
sufficient predictive accuracy.260 Ultimately, one feels returned to square 
one: there does not appear to be “a clear way in principle to evaluate the 
performance of those in charge of the deployment of corporate assets, if 
their duty is to balance the claims made upon the corporation by a variety of 
contesting claimants.”261 
Given such circularity in their model, Blair and Stout undertake a bold 
step which, in my view, clearly opens a pathway into the right direction for 
purposes of modeling with more accuracy (and, thus, predictability) the 
governance structure of the publicly-held corporate firm. Without admitting 
that their team production model is descriptively circular (i.e., team 
members willingly cede control to the board because, structurally, as a 
mediating hierarch the board is best equipped to do the right thing, to 
mediate among and, thereby, protect their respective returns on 
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investment—but “there is no way to set a substantive standard for gauging 
how good a job the board is doing,”262 thus, there is no way to know pre-
investment whether the board is going to do a good job in order to feel 
comfortable enough to invest and cede control in the first place),263 Blair 
and Stout set out to ‘borrow’ legitimacy (and, apparently, with it 
accountability) from outside (corporate) law. They admit that “directors 
enjoy enormous legal discretion in how they choose to manage and allocate 
corporate resources”264 but also posit that there is a “possible important curb 
on director behavior”265 which is, however, nothing that the law provides in 
terms of accountability. Such important curb (or constraint) on the 
directors’ “virtually absolute”266 authority and discretion over the (mis)use 
of corporate assets is found in the “directors’ internalized belief that they 
ought to behave in a careful, loyal and trustworthy fashion.”267 
That is quite a statement. And I believe that it is absolutely correct. As I 
explain more fully in my closing sketches below (as well as, in more detail, 
elsewhere),268 our current microtheoretical models of the firm—including 
the Blair/Stout team production model—leave us with an uncomfortably 
wide gap within each of our respective models as regards their predictive 
ability and, thus, their overall accuracy.269 Blair and Stout point us into the 
right direction with their focus on trust and (intrinsic) trustworthiness of 
corporate directors as underlying safeguards of team-specific investments in 
firms.270 However, such focus is not an integral, organic, and constituent 
part of their team production model. It is entirely exogenous—a quick fix of 
such model, borrowed from outside of the model in order to make the 
model work conceptually. Since the fix, in substance, constitutes what I call 
‘protolegal variables,’ such focus is definitely also borrowing from outside 
the realm of corporate law. There is an a priori realm of normative 
substance that pre-exists and controls corporate law without being any part 
of it. Thus, in my view, Blair and Stout have correctly figured out that 
corporate law is completely irrelevant for purposes of director 
accountability. Or to say it differently: corporate law has no answer—no 
inner normative intelligibility—when it comes to the second, substantive 
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2011] Deconstructing Corporate Governance 393 
question of corporate governance (“Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”). As a 
result, this question can only be answered by recourse to a protolegal realm 
in which variables like those pointed out by Blair and Stout (in particular, 
‘trust’ and ‘trustworthiness’) provide the only operational mechanisms of 
director accountability that we seem to have available (even though they are 
limited and probably not genuine). 
4. The Director Primacy Model 
Who Controls: Board (as a decisionmaker by fiat). 
Whose Interest(s) Control(s): Shareholders (indirectly, all firm 
participants exert some influence since shareholders are residual claimants). 
Main Locus: Quadrant I; with, perhaps, a bit of Quadrant II 
(shareholder interests control; board of directors/management is a sui 
generis decisionmaker with almost unlimited powers and very little 
accountability within corporate law). 
Description. The director primacy model developed by Stephen 
Bainbridge in a series of articles271 over the last decade asserts that 
corporate directors are the holders of all corporate power272 who can 
institute any and all adaptive firm changes by fiat273 and who are controlled 
only by the principle that the proper end of any exercise of their power is 
shareholder wealth maximization.274 However, this check on directors’ 
central decisionmaking power is essentially an unenforceable “contractual 
obligation to maximize the value of the shareholders’ residual claim.”275 
For the first time in microtheoretical models, the board of directors is 
boldly acknowledged as a sui generis body within the corporation,276 not 
‘hired’ but free from any legal strictures of delegation or fiduciary relation 
to a higher, ultimate firm constituent (whether shareholders or other 
stakeholders). The board is no longer an agent for anyone, not even the 
corporation (or the team) itself.277 Its decisionmaking authority is statutory 
(thus, original and non-delegated) and unlimited within the law. Director 
primacy, thus, means “the centralization of essentially nonreviewable 
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decisionmaking authority in the board of directors”278 so that the “board has 
virtually unconstrained freedom to exercise business judgment.”279 
Critique. Professor Bainbridge remains consequent and loyal to his 
contractarian roots280 in answering the second, substantive question of 
corporate governance—namely, “Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”—in the 
identical fashion that the contractarian model of corporate law has answered 
such question (and the shareholder primacy model answered it even before 
the contractarian model). Thus, the same critique applicable to the 
shareholder primacy model and described above must be levied here. In 
essence, there is no contractual (whether explicit or implicit), quasi-
contractual or ‘contractarian’ obligation on the board of directors to 
maximize shareholder value. This is merely an idea—possibly even an 
efficient idea in order to orient director decisionmaking overall—but it is by 
no means the law. It is impossible to find that there is a legal director 
accountability mechanism in place (i.e., a mechanism that is a feature of our 
corporate law ‘on the books’) because of a mere ‘contractarian’ idea which 
is acknowledged by all as (virtually) unenforceable within the law. 
Thus, Bainbridge’s director primacy model deserves full credit for 
correctly pointing out the “virtues of fiat”281 as exercised by the corporate 
board for purposes of corporate decisionmaking efficiency. But if such 
decisionmaking power by fiat—sanctioned by corporate law as 
nonreviewable decisionmaking authority by discretionary fiat—indeed 
cannot be “trumped by either shareholders or courts,”282 the director 
primacy model still owes us an explanation with regard to the normatively 
inevitable ‘vices of fiat.’ The power of fiat of the board as a central 
decisionmaker may not be used only to effectively address uncertainty and 
complexity for purposes of mandating adaptive responses to future 
circumstances facing the corporate endeavor and challenging its continued 
prosperity and survival. It may also be used opportunistically (or may 
opportunistically not be used at all) by a corporate board shirking its 
functional capabilities. Bainbridge acknowledges that a complete theory of 
the firm requires one to explain how the ‘virtues of discretion’ are balanced 
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“against the need to require that discretion be used responsibly.”283 
However, he then only posits that opportunism is simply “deterred by the 
prospect of ex post sanctions, obviating the necessity of drafting a complete 
contract ex ante.”284 Given that, as a matter of corporate law, the board’s 
decisionmaking authority is nonreviewable by either shareholder or courts, 
one seems to be left wondering what those ex post sanctions provided by 
corporate law could be which deter board shirking within the director 
primacy model. Certainly, the unenforceable, aspirational, and 
‘contractarian’ idea of shareholder wealth maximization does not qualify as 
such a deterrent. 
It comes as no surprise, then, that Bainbridge has to revert to the same 
‘quick fix’ in order to fill the gap in his model which Blair and Stout 
utilized for the identical purpose in their team production model. He 
analogizes corporate boards to production teams in which “mutual 
monitoring and peer pressure provide a coercive backstop for a set of 
interpersonal relationships founded on trust and other noncontractual social 
norms.”285 Again, as in the team production model, these “key”286 social 
norms coupled with reciprocal group monitoring of moral (i.e., not legal) 
norm compliance provide the necessary “institutional constraint on agency 
costs.”287 In other words, boards—as Platonic guardians and self-
monitoring hierarchs288— “voluntarily limit their discretion with respect to 
the proper ends of corporate governance by embracing the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm.”289 Thus, I argue that, ultimately, the 
Bainbridge director primacy model ends up at exactly the same conclusion 
that the Blair/Stout team production model appears to arrive at (even though 
both models, at least, implicitly deny that they get to such conclusion by not 
making it explicitly)—namely, that corporate law has nothing to provide 
when it comes to the second, substantive question of corporate governance 
(“Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”). 
B. AN ABSOLUTE DIRECTOR PRIMACY MODEL 
Table 2 outlines, in a nutshell, how the absolute director primacy model 
radically differs from the four current microtheoretical models of the firm 
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discussed above and why, in general, microtheoretical models (i.e., those 
that concentrate on the inner workings of the firm290) are unable to explain 
and predict why the genius of American corporate law does not (more) 
regularly deteriorate into totalitarian corporate boards which misuse their 
absolute decisionmaking authority to the detriment of every other firm 
participant involved. 
 
Table 2: Absolute Director Primacy Model 
 
Model  “Who Controls?”  “Whose Interest(s) 
Control(s)?” 
Main Locus 
in Figure 1 
Absolute 
Director 
Primacy 
board 
(as a decisionmaker 
by fiat, i.e., as a 
modern Leviathan) 
indeterminable 
within current 
models because of 
directors’ absolute 
decisionmaking 
power 
Quadrants 
 I & III 
 
None of the microtheoretical models of the firm discussed above 
ventures into Quadrant III in Figure 1. The absolute director primacy model 
does and fills Quadrant III, as well as Quadrant I, in their entirety. It thereby 
posits not only that the board of directors is a sui generis decisionmaker 
with unlimited authority within corporate law (thus, restating—but more 
radically—what Stephen Bainbridge has already developed in his director 
primacy model), but also, and more importantly, that, as a matter of 
corporate law, there is no overriding firm participant interest that controls 
outcomes or guides the board decisionmaker. When comparing the absolute 
director primacy model to the Blair/Stout team production model on the one 
hand and Bainbridge’s director primacy model on the other hand, one could 
summarize that: (i) the Blair/Stout model provides a good descriptive (but 
no normative) answer to the second question of corporate governance, 
“Whose Interest(s) Control(s)?”; (ii) the Bainbridge director primacy model 
provides a good descriptive (but, likewise, no normative) answer to the first 
question of corporate governance, “Who Controls?”; and (iii) both such 
answers are now combined and synthesized in the absolute director 
primacy model. Put graphically, the combination of Quadrants II & IV of 
the team production model with Quadrant I of the director primacy model 
results in Quadrants I & III of the absolute director primacy model. 
Noticeably, the absolute director primacy model can be viewed as the exact 
opposite of the team production model. Whereas team production insists on 
decisionmaker accountability and, thus, occupies Quadrants II & IV, the 
absolute director primacy model denies that any meaningful modicum of 
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director accountability exists in American corporate law. Consequently, it is 
situated—at least, for the time being—in all of Quadrants I & III. 
By locating the absolute director primacy model in Quadrants I & III, I 
obviously am rejecting the notion that any accountability mechanism exists 
in American corporate law that would allow firm participants, prior to 
making their firm-specific investment, to predict with some accuracy how 
the board of directors will behave in certain situations—thus, how the 
return on their investment as well as its probability are going to be 
controlled by such decisionmaker behavior. By necessity and design, the 
law of fiduciary duties of corporate decisionmakers is open-ended—both 
with regard to its means as well as its ends.291 Under the business judgment 
rule,292 directors can act in any way they see fit and without having to worry 
about any judicial review and second-guessing as long as the court, in 
applying the business judgment rule presumption, can on its own—sua 
sponte—provide some (even the most remote) rational basis for why the 
board of directors might have believed—honestly and in good faith—that 
its decision was (ultimately) in the best interest of the corporation.293 
Therefore, directors are granted full discretion to act opportunistically—
unfettered by any further legal constraint—and to favor any particular cause 
or firm participant interest over any and all others at any point in time as 
long as: (i) no controlling economic self-interest of directors is actualized 
(and remains unsanitized) in the decision; (ii) basic process due care is 
complied with; and (iii) some rudimentary (and, possibly, entirely 
hypothetical) rational explanation can be construed as to why the prevailing 
consensus at the time of the board action might have been that the 
corporation could ultimately benefit in some (tangible or intangible) shape 
or form.294 
The difference between the absolute director primacy model and the 
four microtheoretical models discussed above is therefore as follows: Each 
of the four models posits that, in one form or the other, one only needs to 
determine the controlling interests or norms guiding corporate 
decisionmaking. Once such a determination of decision-guiding interests 
has been accomplished, it controls the exercise of decisionmaking latitude 
(i.e., it controls the decisionmakers themselves) and, therefore, not only 
                                                                                                                           
 291. Cf. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 13, at 677; Allen, Contracts and Communities, 
supra note 5, at 1398. 
 292. For an explanation of the business judgment rule, see supra note 87. 
 293. Apart from sale or liquidation scenarios (in which major assets of the corporation would be 
squandered away by the board for trifles), it seems impossible to come up with any short-, mid- or 
long-term operational decision that we as lawyers cannot trace back to some half-baked rational 
motivation (and, of course, it does not matter whether such motivation was actually underlying the 
board decision or is merely hypothetical). Therefore, all operational decisions—as long as they 
comply with process due care and are made by disinterested directors—receive the absolutist 
protective shield of the business judgment rule. 
 294. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 110; Blair & Stout, Team 
Production, supra note 49, at 746; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 6. 
398 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 5 
results in ex-post accountability but, because of such existant accountability 
mechanism, provides pre-investment predictability and post-investment risk 
measurability—all with varying degrees as per the applicable model. 
The absolute director primacy model reverses this thinking. What we 
can determine is where decisionmaking control is situated and that it should 
be considered sui generis and absolute. Once this determination has been 
made, it controls the actuation of firm participant interests in any manner, 
thus, in an autocratic and inherently unpredictable manner. Therefore, the 
absolute director primacy model—for the time being—not only results in a 
complete lack of ex-post accountability but, because of such lack of an 
accountability mechanism, also results in total ex-ante indeterminability. 
III. CLOSING SKETCHES 
The absolute director primacy model developed herein leads to three 
main conclusions (though they may be preliminary): 
1. The first conclusion can be equated to an answer for the first 
(procedural) question of corporate governance: “Who Control(s)?”. We 
may not like the answer, but I am convinced that the board of directors of a 
Berle-Means corporation is the private-sector equivalent of a modern 
Leviathan.295 Neither shareholders in aggregate nor the corporation itself 
but the board is the corporate sovereign—both de facto and de jure. Its 
decisionmaking is by fiat296 and its decisionmaking authority to run the 
corporation’s business as it sees fit is absolute,297 original,298 infinite,299 and, 
                                                                                                                           
 295. Cf. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1396. 
  Under the liberal-utilitarian model, the law creating and protecting property rights 
and the law enforcing contracts is the law of greatest importance to our welfare. The 
legal value of the highest rank in this classical liberal view is, I suppose, human liberty, 
and the greatest evil is oppression by the leviathan state. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 296. Such authoritative decisional determination by the board is—in the genuine meaning of the 
term ‘fiat’—both dictatorial and, ipse dixit, valid. It is non-reviewable and, ipso facto, irrebuttably 
assumed to be right (which, of course, is exactly the effect of the courts’ application of the 
business judgment rule). See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“The 
business judgment rule exists to protect and promote full and free exercise of the managerial 
power granted to Delaware directors.”) (citing Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 
(Del. 1981)); BAINBRIDGE, THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 38–45. 
 297. Cf. HOWARD H. SPELLMAN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW GOVERNING 
CORPORATE DIRECTIONS 5 (1931) (“[M]odern decisions tend toward an emphasis of the 
directors’ absolutism in the management of the affairs of large corporations; the board of directors 
has achieved a super-control of corporate management and of the corporations legal relations . . . 
.”) (emphasis added); Horwitz, supra note 169, at 214 (“But modern corporate legislation, passed 
during the first quarter of the twentieth century, ratified a new ‘absolutism’ that courts themselves 
had already begun to bestow upon corporate directors.”) (emphasis added). See also Blair & Stout, 
Corporate Law, supra note 74, at 251. 
 298. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 299. Cf. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., supra note 49, at 190. 
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thus, sui generis.300 Comparable to the Hobbesian bellum omnium contra 
omnes within the sovereign state,301 the corporate entity or aggregation is 
ineluctably characterized by perpetual conflicts among self-interested 
corporate constituents.302 In order to manage—not solve (since they are 
insolvable)—those conflicts which present a perennial, systemic risk to the 
internal cohesion, adaptability, and, thus, prosperity and ultimate survival of 
the firm, corporate law has to allocate infinite and absolute decisionmaking 
authority within one core group of corporate constituents who are thus 
called upon to attend to, and decide with non-reviewable finality, all those 
matters of firm sustainability on behalf of the whole—i.e., the corporation 
(whether seen as a separate entity or as an aggregation of firm 
participants).303 American corporate law is unmistakably clear as to who 
such single core group of corporate constituents is: the board of directors.304 
                                                                                                                           
The power and control that are present in all fiduciary relationships is exaggerated in 
the corporation where the indeterminate length of the enterprise and the practically 
infinite array of investment opportunities for the corporation make any possibility of 
specified limitations on directors’ power or ongoing control by the stockholders 
unrealistic. 
Id. 
 300. Sui generis decisionmaking authority of corporate directors means that their 
decisionmaking power is non-derivative. In particular, shareholder primacy models incorrectly 
assume that the decisionmaking authority of corporate boards is derivative (i.e., delegated to 
corporate boards by the shareholder franchise—at least, through the mechanism of board elections 
during which shareholders vote). This assumption ignores the de lege lata reality of board 
authority. See Dooley, supra note 11, at 467 (describing the problem of allocating authority within 
the corporate firm as “the universally recognized requirement for the establishment of, and vesting 
of supreme authority in, the board of directors”) (emphasis added). 
  At some point at the beginning of the twentieth century, American legal opinion 
began decisively to shift to the view that “the powers of the board of directors . . . are 
identical with the powers of the corporation.” Earlier, the dominant view, as expressed 
by the United States Supreme Court, was that “when the charter was silent, the ultimate 
determination of the management of the corporate affairs rests with its stock holders.” 
Horwitz, supra note 169, at 214 (citations omitted). 
 301. That is, “war of all against all.” THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER, FORM 
AND POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH, ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL, ch. XIII, at 64 (2d ed., 1886) 
(“Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in 
awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against 
every man.”); THOMAS HOBBES, ELEMENTA PHILOSOPHICA DE CIVE, Præfatio (1642) 
(“[C]onditionem hominum extra societatem civilem (quam conditionem appellare liceat statum 
naturae) aliam non esse quam bellum omnium contra omnes; atque in eo bello jus esse omnibus in 
omnia.”). Cf. Peter J. Burke & Jan E. Stets, Trust and Commitment Through Self-Verification, 62 
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 347, 347 (1999). 
 302. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 599. 
 303. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION, supra note 68, at 69 (“Under conditions of widely 
dispersed information and the need for speed in decisions, authoritative control at the tactical level 
is essential for success.”); Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5; Bainbridge, The 
Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 552; Dooley, supra note 11, at 466. 
 304. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 4, at 72 (stating that: (i) shareholders have 
“virtually no power to control” the business and affairs of the corporation; (ii) the board of 
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“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter 
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as 
may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of 
incorporation.”305 
A corporate board can act completely opportunisticly and unfettered by 
legal constraints once it refrains from: (i) gross negligence in its 
decisionmaking process (which gross negligence would additionally have to 
be well documented and information thereof would have to be widely 
disseminated);306 (ii) bad faith conduct (which bad faith conduct would also 
have to be well documented and information thereof would have to be 
widely disseminated);307 and (iii) purely self-interested transactions that are 
seen as disloyal under the law.308 In the Berle-Means corporation, a well-
advised corporate board always meets those minimal standards. 
Accordingly, in light of our American corporate law ‘on the books,’ a 
disinterested corporate board is virtually uncontrollable. 
2. My second conclusion is less straightforward. It relates to the second 
(substantive) question of corporate governance: “Whose Interest(s) 
Control(s)?”. As outlined above, this question circumscribes the second 
core function of any corporate governance system. After having allocated 
absolute, original, infinite, and sui generis authority for making adaptive 
decisions for firm sustainability in a core group of decisionmakers (as per 
my first conclusion above, the board of directors), the corporate governance 
system should also define the norms and interests that should guide the 
internal decisionmakers in their decisionmaking. Otherwise, any exercise of 
authority would always be arbitrary. An uncontrollable board of directors 
would also always be ‘out-of-control.’ Similarly, the autocratic board of 
directors would also be better described as a totalitarian institution of 
governance. 
Thus, the extent to which the board of directors as sovereign may 
exercise its authority on behalf of the corporation—even if absolute, 
                                                                                                                           
directors and senior management “effectively controls;” and (iii) “[a]s a doctrinal matter, 
moreover, corporate law essentially carves this separation into stone”); COX & HAZEN, supra note 
4, at 149 (stating that the board of directors “is legally the supreme authority in matters of the 
corporation’s regular business management”). See also Franklin A. Gevurtz, The European 
Origins and the Spread of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 STETSON L. REV. 925, 925 
(2004) (“Around the world, the legal norm is that corporations are managed by, or under the 
direction of, a board of directors.”) (footnote omitted). 
 305. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010). See also REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 
(1984). Under the corporation statutes of all states, corporations are managed by or under the 
direction of a board of directors as the statutory default rule. See, e.g., Dent, Jr., supra note 97, at 
1216; Gevurtz, Origins of the Corporate Board, supra note 76, at 92; Ribstein, Why 
Corporations?, supra note 49, at 188. 
 306. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); Stout, Proper Motives, 
supra note 77, at 6. 
 307. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); Stone v. Ritter, 911 
A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 308. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 746. 
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infinite, and sui generis—must be conditional on ‘something.’ In Thomas 
Hobbes’s Leviathan model, it is natural law that obligates, thus, controls the 
sovereign—though such condition is to be understood as a moral, not a 
legal, obligation. In other words, it is a protolegal obligation, unenforceable 
in a court of law. I cautioned above that it might not be possible—at least, 
not within the confines of our current corporate governance system in 
itself—to locate the norms and interests which ultimately bind (or, at least, 
guide) absolute director primacy to the best interests of the corporation. My 
second conclusion, therefore, is that a satisfactory answer to the second, 
substantive question of corporate governance is logically indeterminable 
within current microtheoretical models of the firm. We have to consider 
model-transcending protolegal variables309 (for example, any applicable 
‘moral’ obligations)—as perhaps only transient bases of ex-ante 
determinability and ex-post accountability—and explain their external, 
exogenous influence310 over current microtheoretical models of the firm,311 
in order to properly model the firm-internal intricacies of corporate 
governance with sufficient predictive ability. 
3. Finally, as my third conclusion, I need to declare that all of this 
leaves the absolute director primacy model (at least, for the time being) 
with a fundamental, yet unexplained, dilemma312—namely, the somewhat 
preliminary and uncomfortable result that the board of directors in a Berle-
Means corporation is not only autocratic, it can be totalitarian if, when, and 
where it so pleases.313 As a matter of corporate law, the board of directors is 
akin to an ‘unguided missile.’ If there are no recognizable and enforceable 
decision-guiding norms or principles within corporate law, many—if not, 
                                                                                                                           
 309. “In the parlance of economics,” there is, however, the risk that these variables turn out to 
be “observable, but not verifiable.” Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 96. See also Blair & 
Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 419 n.35; Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate 
Law, supra note 5, at 1617. 
 310. Cf. Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 96. 
 311. Cf. Allen, Contracts and Communities, supra note 5, at 1397 (describing how proponents 
of the social model of human interaction see the utility of law resting “in part on presupposition of 
shared norms including those of fairness and trust”). 
 312. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trust, supra note 70 (calling this dilemma a “riddle” of corporate law); 
Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 8 (describing this dilemma as a “basic mystery”). 
 313. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trust, supra note 70, at 1791 (“The net result is that, as a practical 
matter, a negligent director is more likely to be hit by lightning after leaving her board meeting 
than she is to pay damages.”); Jones, supra note 90, at 117 (“Independent directors face an 
infinitesimal risk of paying personally for damages to the corporation caused by their breach of 
fiduciary duty.”); Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., supra note 49, at 190 (stating that “directors 
have largely unlimited power over the corporation and its affairs”); Stout, Proper Motives, supra 
note 77, at 6–7. See also Alces, supra note 125, at 242. 
It is dangerous and costly to assume that fiduciary duties function well in the corporate 
context. The assumption may give shareholders a false sense of security or a belief that 
they are able to discipline management effectively when in fact, because of the very 
limited nature of corporate governance duties, they are not. 
Id. 
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infinite—avenues are available in order to make adaptive corporate 
decisions. This, inevitably, creates significant room for opportunism (since 
it is uncertainty which always opens the realm of opportunism—good or 
bad) and, thus, economic agency costs.314 In turn, as a firm participant, one 
seems to be relegated to only something like ‘hope’315 (or—more to the 
point—’trust,’ ‘loyalty,’ and similar socio-contextual,316 behavior-oriented 
and reciprocal317 variables318 based on pre-coded ‘expectations,’ ‘counter-
expectations,’ and ‘expectation-expectations’ and aimed at reducing social 
complexity319)—whether reasonable or not—that directors know what they 
do, that they have internalized the correct moral compass,320 and, thus, will 
‘do the right thing’321 more often than not.322 But ‘hope’—maybe even ill-
founded in many cases—is not something that we can and should accept as 
a satisfactory explanation and basis for the daily phenomenon of general 
investor confidence pre-investment in the face of absent director 
accountability post-investment.323 The question simply becomes: if profit-
maximizing is not enforced by corporate law, why does it nonetheless 
happen—as a matter of almost overwhelming routine—in today’s corporate 
reality?324 An attempt at answering this question must therefore, in my 
                                                                                                                           
 314. See Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 4 (stating that, if we only consider financial 
rewards to directors, i.e., make assumptions based only on rational selfish behavior of directors, 
“directors seem to have little reason to break a sweat in the boardroom”). 
 315. Cf. Id. at 18 (stating that “we must inevitably rely on directors’ internalized sense of 
responsibility as their primary if not their sole motive for exercising judgment and care”) 
(emphasis added). 
 316. See Id. at 13. 
 317. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
 318. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 319. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
 320. Cf. Elhauge, supra note 134, at 740 (“internalized moral norms”); Stout, Proper Motives, 
supra note 77, at 23 (“internal gyroscope”). 
 321. Cf. Blair & Stout, Director Accountability, supra note 58, at 439; Nadelle Grossman, 
Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a Climate of Corporate Governance 
Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 465–66 (2007); Rock & Wachter, Norms & 
Corporate Law, supra note 5; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 9, 23. See also Meurer, 
supra note 9, at 740 (stating with regard to the problem of unforeseeable contingencies in 
transaction-cost-theory ‘contracting’ that “this begs the questions of how a firm gets managers to 
be pure profit maximizers”). 
 322. To complicate things further, much of what happens in the corporate boardroom (and can 
be hoped for to happen in the boardroom) depends on the particular corporation and follows the 
(aspirational and prevailing) procedures, standards, and practices for director behavior of such 
specific corporation. See, e.g., Rock & Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, supra note 5. 
 323. Cf. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., supra note 49, at 191 (“Why would anybody invest 
money in a corporation, an institution over which she has no control?”); Stout, Proper Motives, 
supra note 77, at 3, 8, 9. 
 324. See Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating 
with regard to investors who trade shares in well-developed markets in reliance on the integrity of 
the price set by the market that “it is hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who does 
not rely on market integrity” and wondering “[w]ho would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked 
crap game?”). Or formulated differently, the question is not only “why do shareholders in public 
companies have so little power?”, see Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 792, but: why do 
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judgment, thoroughly investigate the external, exogenous protolegal 
influences—designated as controlling and compelling325 variables under the 
absolute director primacy model developed herein—on the inner workings 
of the firm.326 
Apparently, many of us are also more than a bit uncomfortable327 with 
the apparent absence of director accountability within American corporate 
law. Professor Bainbridge, for example, has repeatedly described the board 
of directors as “a sort of Platonic guardian” similar to the philosopher-kings 
in Plato’s Republic.328 Those philosopher-kings always seem to see it fit to 
rule “for the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic 
action, but simply as a matter of duty.”329 Perhaps even more brazenly, there 
is “Frank Knight’s mythic entrepreneur,” a “free market superhero,”330 who 
is the ultimately responsible manager owning and controlling her (sole-
proprietor) business and doing what is right out of sheer self-motivation and 
self-respect, thus, without any legal mandate being required or 
operational.331 
                                                                                                                           
shareholders in public companies have so little power and still invest? Why do investors who 
know that they have almost no power over their investment ex post (other than investment exit 
with a predictable loss of value) still confidently decide to invest without any ex ante bargained-
for accountability in place? Cf. Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 92, at 801 (pointing out “an 
often overlooked fact of business life: investors are not forced to purchase shares in public 
corporations at gunpoint”); id. at 803 (“Is it possible that shareholders, like Ulysses, sometimes 
see advantage in ‘tying their own hands’ and ceding control over the corporation to directors 
largely insulated from their own influence?”). 
 325. See Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77, at 14. 
 326. Id. at 9. Of course, such investigation has already been commenced in both: (i) “the 
economic literature on norms in organizations”—usually rubricated under the heading of “self-
enforcing” or “self-governing” contracts, Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 96, at 1703; Rock 
& Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, supra note 5, at 1609; 1613, and (ii) the legal academia 
focused on the co-existence of (corporate) law and norms and the latter’s influence on (and, 
maybe, over) the former—the so-called “law and norms” literature. See, e.g., Rock & Wachter, 
Islands of Conscious Power, supra note 8. 
 327. Cf. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 49, at 744 (describing a “growing sense of 
unease among many corporate scholars, a sense that the principle-agent model may not tell the 
whole story”). 
 328. Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 8, 33; Bainbridge, Convergence Debate, 
supra note 2, at 51; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 550–51 n.21. 
 329. Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 75, at 8 n.28 (quoting PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 
289–90 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House 1991)) (emphasis added); Bainbridge, 
Convergence Debate, supra note 2, at 51 n.38; Bainbridge, The Means and Ends, supra note 3, at 
551 n.21. This guardianship concept seems to correlate with “[n]eoclassical [economic] theory 
[which] views the firm as a set of feasible production plans . . . over [which] a selfless and 
compliant manager [presides].” Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 4, at 299. Similarly, Adolf 
Berle viewed “the emergence of independent corporate managers as a [beneficial] development . . 
. [namely], a mechanism for producing truly public-regarding servants.” Romano, Metapolitics, 
supra note 48, at 923–24 (citing BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 356). See also ADOLF A. 
BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 2–3, 8 (1959). 
 330. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 605. 
 331. See KNIGHT, supra note 4, at 270. See also BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 356 (arguing 
that society could recognize corporate management with absolute powers that were constraint only 
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Obviously, we cannot find evidence of Platonic guardians or Knightian 
entrepreneurs in our American corporate law as it is currently ‘on the 
books’ (nor can we find much evidence of them in the reality of 
corporations and corporate boards in order to be sufficiently comforted that 
we could, and do, live without any accountability mechanism at work).332 
Rather, I suspect that we are again talking—if even so briefly, peripherally, 
and nonchalantly—about model-external protolegal variables which we 
seem to presuppose and import wholesale into our corporate governance 
system without any apparent need to explain or account for such variables 
underlying our respective models. In other words, we just ‘borrow’ 
legitimacy (and, apparently, with it accountability) from outside the law in 
order to close the uncomfortably wide gap left within our models of the 
firm as regards their predictive ability and, thus, their overall accuracy.333 
Unless we are prepared to accept that the corporate board of directors, by 
law, is designed as an ‘unguided missile’ that lacks inner legitimacy and 
intelligibility (all of which I am neither ready nor willing to accept), we 
should set out and determine, deconstruct and explain those protolegal 
variables which our microtheoretical models of the firm critically depend 
upon and which make corporate governance and the genius of American 
corporate law autocratic and elitist but not—at least, not as a matter of 
regular course—also totalitarian.334 
                                                                                                                           
by management’s sense of morality and public duty); O’Kelley, Theory of the Modern 
Corporation, supra note 4, at 758, 761. 
 332. Cf. McDonnell, supra note 75, at 157 (“Bainbridge is no fool—he is well aware that 
director self-monitoring is far from a complete solution to the agency problem.”). 
 333. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 334. Or to say it more bluntly: I assume that most of us expect countries like Greece, Denmark, 
Ireland, or Portugal, see supra text accompanying note 37,—or, for that matter, any country—to 
have a stable, maybe tripartite, form of national government where sturdy checks and balances 
exist among the branches of government and where the rule of law is firmly established—at least, 
in principle and as a matter of due course. In comparison thereto, I do not understand why most of 
us seem to be fine with the fact that an economic behemoth like Wal-Mart can be a pure-bred 
oligopoly where a mere sixteen individuals (i.e., its board of directors)—with, arguably, an 
overwhelmingly large degree of financial, class and career ‘inbreeding’—can decide the affairs of 
an economic undertaking that rivals some of the largest and most sophisticated national economies 
in the world—all without much legal oversight, if any. Either corporate boards, as decisionmakers 
by fiat, lack legitimacy—or our corporate law, conferring absolute primacy and by-fiat 
decisionmaking authority to corporate directors, lacks legitimacy. Cf. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, 
supra note 13, at 22. 
  That is, unless we can find a way to explain legitimacy as well as its sources. We therefore 
need to embark on a serious deconstruction exercise if we want to satisfactorily explain the 
societal value of putting the twenty-eighth largest economy on this globe in 2008 in the hands of 
sixteen elitist, absolutist and possibly totalitarian decisionmakers without any measurable legal 
accountability. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise, supra note 3, at 604 n.21 (asking 
whether “we want to encourage an institution that is disproportionately white, male and 
conservative to make social policy?”); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 77. 
